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CULPABILITY AND SENTENCING UNDER
MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THE




Since 1791, the United States Constitution has offered some
assurance that sentences would be neither cruel nor unusual,
excessive nor disproportionate.1 This-protection stems from the
Eighth Amendment and provides the Constitutional background
against which sentences are to be judged. Culpability, or the
moral blameworthiness of an offender, lies at the center of this
analysis. In a rational and fair system of sentencing, culpability is
assessed within the context of both the offense and the offender.
A truly proportionate sentence looks beyond the circumstances
of a particular case to the circumstances which gave rise to the
offense, and the relevant conduct and criminal history of the
offender. If this link between culpability and the punishment
imposed is severed, then the foundations upon which the crimi-
nal justice system are based are rendered morally suspect.
Admittedly, no system of sentencing is capable of precisely
equating culpability with sentence length. Human intuitions and
perceptions, however insightful, cannot enable us to equate such
incommensurables as sentence length and culpability. No
mental yardstick exists by which a sentence can be measured out
and tailored to the moral blameworthiness of the offender. Even
* B.S., 1993, Boston University; J.D. Candidate, 1996, Notre Dame Law
School; ThomasJ. White Scholar, 1994-96. The author thanks ProfessorJohn
Robinson and Professor Jimmy Gurule.
1. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The
Supreme Court first held the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
applicable to federal sentencing in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
(holding that the punishment of cadena temporal, which involved hard labor,
confinement and life-long civil disabilities, was disproportionate to the crime of
falsifying information on a public document). The Eighth Amendment was
first held applicable to state sentencing by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (90 day sentence for the
offense of drug addiction was held disproportionate to the offense).
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if per impossible a sentencer could conclusively say that one year in
prison is the appropriate punishment for a particular offense,
one year in prison means different things to different offenders.
To a person who supports a family, for example, prison might
have more serious implications than for an offender without a
family.
These important distinctions between defendants cannot be
overlooked, and should be reflected in the punishments imposed
upon them. Despite this need for some degree of sentence indi-
vidualization, Congress enacted mandatory minimum statutes.
These statutes purport to be an accurate reflection of an
offender's culpability, yet they base punishment almost solely
upon a consideration of the nature of the crime committed.
Therefore, a sentence based on the defendant's actual culpability
is the exception and not the rule in a system of harsh sentences
targeted at mid to high level participants in a crime. The
unbending rigidity of mandatory minimums has led to a host of
problems unanticipated or inadequately considered by their
drafters, and have augmented the disparity, manipulability, and
uncertainty already present in the federal sentencing system.
Mandatory minimums shift the focus of sentencing away from
the offender and his or her culpability to the offense and its per-
ceived seriousness. To underemphasize the characteristics, his-
tory, and role of an offender is to sacrifice proportionality for the
procedural benefits of uniformity and certainty. This is the
actual role that mandatory minimums have played.
Consider also that Congress and state legislators enacted
harsh mandatory minimum penalties to combat increases in
crime rates for various offenses. Not only were severe sentences
intended to deter others from committing those offenses, but
legislators, and for the most part, the general public, believed
that the seriousness of the offense justified these lengthy,
mandatory penalties. But in the quest for punishments that "fit
the crime," legislators failed to note that in advocating policies of
general deterrence, a just and proportionate sentence for each
offender only becomes more elusive.
There exists still another serious impediment to the attain-
ment of this ideal culpability analysis. At some point, a choice
must be made about what circumstances of the offense and of
the offender are to be considered. Unless all relevant factors are
considered, proportionality in sentencing can never be truly
accomplished, yet any attempt to articulate these circumstances
would necessitate either a "wide-open" rule, in which the judge
has total discretion, or a finite list enumerating every possible
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factor to be weighed when sentencing. The practical realities of
the criminal justice system render this an impossible solution.
The reality is that the sentencing system exists in a world of
degrees and imperfections. There are, for the most part, only
more or less 'Just" results. Therefore, when given a choice,
sentencers should choose a methodology that produces the most
'Just" sentence, though the ideal may remain unattainable.
When Congress grants judges the discretion crucial to their role
as sentencers, the focus of sentencing remains on the circum-
stances of the offense, but coupled with consideration of the
individual offender. In this way, the sentencer has sufficient lati-
tude to tailor a sentence to the moral blameworthiness and back-
ground of a defendant. Mandatory minimums, on the other
hand, focus almost solely on the offense committed and have a
tendency to group similarly situated defendants together.
Instead of furthering the goal of proportionate sentencing, in
many cases mandatory minimums have the opposite result. It is
for this reason that mandatory minimums should be abolished
and the current sentencing guidelines expanded to include, to
the fullest extent possible, the characteristics and background of
the offender.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the philosophy of pun-
ishment and how those differing philosophies have traditionally
shaped penal policies. Part III traces the history of mandatory
minimums and their relation to recidivist statutes, as well as to
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Part IV highlights some of the principal failures of mandatory
minimums and Part V introduces the federal sentencing guide-
lines, a very different approach to sentencing. Part VI contrasts
the federal guidelines with state guidelines, and generally con-
cludes that the state systems have been more successful in reach-
ing their goals than their federal counterparts. Part VII discusses
the "relative" success of the federal guidelines by comparing
them to mandatory minimums. Part VIII outlines the departure
and appellate review procedures under the federal guidelines, as
well as some of the approaches the different circuits have taken
to guideline departures. Part IX details some of the weaknesses
of the federal guidelines. Part X connects mandatory minimums
and the sentencing guidelines to the proportionality principle -
the principle that the punishment imposed should relate as
much as possible to the culpability and criminal history of the
offender. Finally, Part XI suggests that mandatory minimums
should be repealed and also offers ways in which a modified
guideline system might result in the most proportionate sentence
possible, given the practical constraints of the criminal justice
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system as it exists today. The recommendations in this article
focus primarily on the federal sentencing guidelines, because of
their nationwide impact and also because of the attention that
they have received in the literature.
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT THROUGH MANDATORY
MINIMUMS
Traditionally, philosophers have developed their theories of
punishment around the different purposes that punishment can
serve. Most often these theories are classified as either prospec-
tive or retrospective. Each theory has been favored at different
times in the history of the American federal and state criminal
justice systems, and has helped to shape sentencing and penal
policies significantly.
For 200 years now, utilitarianism has provided the dominant
prospective account of punishment in the West. A utilitarian
sentencer weighs the deterrent benefits of punishment against
the sentence imposed, and focuses on the consequences of pun-
ishing.2 Under a utilitarian philosophy, punishment is justified
to the extent that the aggregate benefits of punishing outweigh
the incidental human or financial costs.' Critics of utilitarianism
argue that according to its doctrines, punishment of the inno-
cent may sometimes be justified if the benefits to society as a
whole are greater than any loss that individual might suffer.4
Similarly, the release of an individual who is guilty of a crime is
also sometimes justified if his or her release would promote more
good than harm in society.5 This obviously "unjust" result comes
about because, for the utilitarian, punishment is the means for
achieving a certain end, whether it be deterrence or rehabilita-
tion. The offense itself is not essential to the justification of pun-
ishment. More important are the consequences or objectives of
that punishment.6
2. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAw (1962); and Andrew Von
Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishmen4 in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE 55,
57-58 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
3. Von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 57-58.
4. Igor Primoratz notes that utilitarianism also may lead to the
paradoxical result that it would be morally justifiable not to punish an offender
when the benefits of that punishment could be achieved through other means,
such as by producing an illusion of punishment. See IGOR PRIMORATZ,
JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 42 (1989).
5. BENIHAM, supra note 2, at 396.
6. PasmoRATz, supra note 4, at 41.
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Throughout history, retaliation also has formed the basis for
retrospective penal philosophy.7 It may, in fact, be the only the-
ory of punishment which entertains notions of exact commensu-
rability between the offense committed and the punishment
imposed. "An eye for an eye" lies at the center of retaliatory the-
ory, and a scheme of punishment can easily be constructed upon
this principle. If an offender kills, his own life is taken, and so
on. The fatal defect in a retaliatory system of punishment, how-
ever, is that it fails to consider the mental state, or mens rea, of the
offender. Any morally defensible criminal code makes distinc-
tions among those who kill maliciously, intentionally, negligently
or innocently. If a person who has killed in self-defense, for
example, is subjected to retaliatory death, it cannot be said that
he or she has been given a-punishment that is in any way propor-
tionate to the offense committed.
Some other schools of thought advocate a 'Just deserts" or
retributive theory of punishment, which punishes according to
the gravity of the offense and the intent and prior criminal his-
tory of the offender.' Retributivists argue that criminals deserve
punishment, and that therefore society is morally justified in
imposing it.9  Articulating this rationale, Immanual Kant
denounced punishment that sought to promote some other
good, such as rehabilitation or deterrence, either for society or
for the offender, and advocated the imposition of punishment
solely because the offender had committed a crime.1" This was
consistent with his Second Categorical Imperative, which stated
that others were never to be treated only as means, but rather
also as ends in themselves.11 Kant believed that when a crime was
7. See Broadus A. Spivey, The Code of Hammurabi, The Advocate, (Jan.
1995) (Appendix D). See also, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT
To THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, at 34 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
REPORT].
8. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623,
1626 (1992).
9. PRImoRATz, supra note 4.
10.. IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 100 (1965). Kant
wrote that "U]uridical punishment can never be used merely as a means to
promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime." Id.
11. CARLJ. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 178 (1949). The Second
Categorical Imperative is as follows: "Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether on your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as means, but always at the same time as an end." Id. His First
Categorical Imperative states that an individual should "[a] ct as if the maxim of
your action were to become by your will a general law of nature." Id. at 170.
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committed, punishment of the offender was not only warranted,
but required, regardless of its consequences. 12 For Kant, punish-
ment depended solely upon the offender's culpability and not
any perceived societal benefits."3 Retributive theories focus on
the crime itself as the most important factor in sentencing, and
these theories understand crime to involve both a wrongful act
(actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea). Prior history
then tempers or aggravates the initial culpability
determination.14
A combination of retributive and retaliatory philosophies
fathered the outburst of mandatory minimum statutes.
Mandatory minimums are retaliatory in the sense that they often
were enacted in a political climate which demanded "tough on
crime" measures from the legislatures. The response of the fed-
eral and state legislatures to that demand was reminiscent of the
"eye for an eye" mentality of retaliatory theorists. However,
mandatory minimums incorporate retributive principles in that
the primary determinant of punishment is the offense itself, and
in some cases, the prior history of the offender. 5 Through the
use of mandatory minimums, Congress sought to reduce uncer-
tainty and disparity in the sentencing process and to bring the
sentence into line with the culpability of the offender.
1 6
12. "The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe
to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happiness
looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal from
punishment or by reducing the amount of it. . ." KANT, supra note 10.
13. According to Kant, even if a criminal who was condemned to death
would agree to subject himself to dangerous, but potentially ground-breaking
medical experiments in exchange for a pardon, that criminal must be
punished, regardless of the potential benefits to society. Id. at 100-101. This
philosophy rejects utilitarianism insofar as utilitarianism would not punish the
criminal if the benefits to society were at all greater than the harm caused by a
criminal going unpunished. See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
14. Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss,
101 YALE L.J. 1773, 1781 (1992). In fact, one of the primary ways in which
retributivism differs from retaliatory theories is the distinctions that
retributivists draw between different levels of culpability based on the mental
state of the offender. Both theories focus on the crime itself as the primary
indication of culpability; with retaliation, it is the sole determinant.
15. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 5-6.
Other proponents of a retributive philosophy are more properly called
"limiting retributivists," and would use the circumstances of the offender and
the offense to impose a ceiling on the punishment imposed. NORVAL MoRIus,
MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982).
16. This is not to be taken out of context, however, as a "culpability"
determination under mandatory minimums focuses on the characteristics of
the offense (amount of drugs, use of a weapon, etc) and the criminal history of
the offender, and NOT specific defendant characteristics like childhood, age,
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Mandatory minimums were also shaped by another purpose
of punishment - to deter the offender from committing future
crimes (special deterrence) and other potential offenders from
committing targeted offenses (general deterrence.)17 Originally,
legislators thought that a severe and certain sentence would
effectively deter others from committing crimes.18 This belief
led to the use of mandatory minimums to target those classes of
offenses which were thought to pose the greatest threat to soci-
ety.19 Though some judges, legislators, and others involved in
sentencing now have serious doubts about the ability of
mandatory minimums to deter, the idea that punishment is a
useful deterrent persists and is continually used tojustify sentenc-
ing under these statutes.2 °
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Mandatory minimum statutes on the federal level can be
traced back as early as 1790,21 but were a rarity in the criminal
justice system until the 1950s. Like Congress, most states pre-
ferred to grant sentencing discretion to the trial courts to avoid
the rigidity of a fixed sentencing scheme. 22 However, through-
out the early part of the 19th Century, federal and state
mandatory minimums were enacted more frequently, on a piece-
meal basis, depending on the particular penal policies at the
time. The 1950s witnessed a resurgence of federal support for
harsh penal policies, and the Narcotic Control Act of 195623 used
mandatory minimums in a completely new way - to target an
entire class of offenses.24 Their apparent potential to deter cer-
tain offenses was thought tojustify the severity of the sentence.25
education, etc.) Thus, a culpability determination under mandatory minimums
is only part of a defendant's total blameworthiness.
17. Dolinko, supra note 8, at 1626.
18. Id. See also MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 6
(quoting an excerpt from THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COMMITTEE ON NARcoTICs, S. REP. No. 1997, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956).
19. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
20. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 93-110.
See also Robert S. Mueller, III, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 4 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 230 (1992).
21. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
22. Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform. 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 68 (1993).
23. Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 651 (1956).
24. These offenses included those involving drugs or violent crimes.
25. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
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Another shift in ideology resulted in the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.26 Congress
found that mandatory penalties often did not correspond to the
seriousness of the offense and did not allow the individual cir-
cumstances of each case to be considered.27 More importantly,
as a deterrent mandatory minimums had questionable effects on
reducing the rate of drug law violations.28 Consequently, almost
all mandatory minimums addressing drug-related crimes, with
the exception of Continuing Criminal Enterprise offenses, were
eliminated. 9 In their stead Congress instituted discretionary
sentencing, which gave sentencers significantly more control
over the process.3 0
During this period, states also began moving towards a more
discretionary system of sentencing. By the early 1980s, voluntary
sentencing guidelines existed in most states."1 These guidelines
were often developed at the state level, but more frequently they
were promulgated at the county or judicial district level.3 2
Unfortunately, most of these voluntary guidelines were quickly
abolished, as they were found to have very little effect on the
sentences imposed. 3 Nevertheless, many state legislators and
26. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801-1509
(1970). See also, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 108 (1990) (reprinting the statements
of then Representative George Bush from the Congressional Record in which
he said "The bill eliminates mandatory minimum penalties, except for
professional criminals. Contrary to what one might imagine, however, this will
result in better justice and more appropriate sentences.")
27. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7.
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 7. See also 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).
30. There are generally five types of sentencing schemes: (1) determinate
- which specifies the sentence to be imposed (and actually served, i.e. because
of the absence of the availability of parole) for a given offense; (2)
indeterminate - which specifies a sentence to be imposed and provides for
parole as a means of reducing a sentence; (3) discretionary - in which the
judge is virtually unconstrained in fashioning a sentence; (4) guidelines -
which specify the factors which may be considered by a sentencer as well as
their impact on the final sentence, and also provide a range in which the
offender should be sentenced in the absence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances; and (5) mandatory minimums - which state the sentence to be
imposed for the commission of an offense, but permit certain adjustments for
assistance to the authorities, drug quantities, or whether or not a weapon was
used during the commission of the offense. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S.
361 (1989) (discussing the difference between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing).
31. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, in 17
CrME AND JUSTICE 140 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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sentencers thought that the problems with determinate sentenc-
ing, mainly overly harsh and disproportionate sentences,
demanded an alternative solution to mandatory minimums as
the sentencing method of choice.34 Similarly, the problems with
indeterminate sentencing, particularly the wide variations in
sentences for similarly situated offenders, also influenced the cre-
ation of guideline sentencing systems both in some states and on
the federal level.
It was this dissatisfaction with both determinate sentencing
and past experience with indeterminate sentencing that
prompted the states to devote substantial efforts to developing
sentencing guidelines, despite the initial disappointment with
the voluntary guidelines. 35 States wanted to preserve enough dis-
cretion in sentencing to maintain elements of flexibility in the
system, but at the same time, structure the process to rid the sys-
tem of unfettered discretion.3 6 Guidelines are significantly more
discretionary than mandatory minimums insofar as they allow a
judge a certain amount of latitude in fashioning a sentence to
accurately reflect the culpability and criminal history of the
offender. More factors relating to both the offense and the
offender may be considered by the sentencer when reaching a
punishment, and there is a range of appropriate sentences, as
opposed to just one. Guidelines are still less discretionary than
the previous system of indeterminate sentencing because of the
often substantial restrictions placed on the factors that a sen-
tencer may properly consider when sentencing. Nevertheless,
even at their most restrictive, sentencing guidelines are more dis-
cretionary than mandatory minimums.
The acceptance of sentencing guidelines in place of deter-
minate sentencing can be partly attributed to then-U.S. district
judge Marvin Frankel's influential book, Criminal Sentences: Law
Without OrderY Judge Frankel proposed that sentencing com-
missions be established to research sentencing practices,
prosecutorial charging policies, and other aspects of sentencing
in order to create a system of guidelines for judges to use when
sentencing. These guidelines would be mandatory, in the sense
that judges had to consult the guideline manual when sentenc-
ing, but the judge would have discretion to increase or decrease
34. Id. Tonry writes that "[t]he voluntary guidelines were often created
by judges in hopes that by putting their own houses in order they would
forestall passage of mandatory or determinate sentencing laws." Id. (citation
omitted).
35. Tonry, supra note 31, at 140.
36. Id.
37. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIrINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrHOUT ORDER (1973).
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the sentence based on various aggravating or mitigating factors.
3 8
The sentence would then be appealable by dissatisfied parties.
Judge Frankel's proposal had widespread appeal and helped a
limited version of discretionary sentencing (as opposed to unfet-
tered discretion) regain a strong foothold in both federal and
state sentencing systems.
Judge Frankel believed that a limited form of discretionary
sentencing was superior to mandatory minimums to the extent
that the sentencer was able to particularize punishment depend-
ing on the needs and culpability of each offender.3 9 In reaching
a sentence, one prominent factor considered by the courts was
the offender's potential for rehabilitation.40 Once an offender
was imprisoned, parole authorities assessed the actual progress
that he or she made and prepared a report on that progress.
The various state or federal parole boards, aided by this report,
then could reduce a sentence further for "good behavior."41
Discretionary sentencing and its accompanying parole system,
however, soon became the objects of much criticism.42
In the early 1980s, mandatory minimum statutes were re-
enacted to combat the ever-increasing crime rate. Instead of
controlling and deterring crime, discretionary sentencing had
resulted only in uncertain and widely disparate sentences.4" The
problem apparently rested in unfettered judicial discretion."
While providing wide ranges within which to sentence, indeter-
minate sentencing furnished no point at which to begin the anal-
ysis of an offender's culpability.45 Some judges began at the
bottom of the range while others began at the top, with each
then adjusting the sentence depending on the particular inci-
dents of the crime and the offender.' These differing
approaches had proven costly in terms of uniformity and cer-
38. Id.
39. Id. at 118-124. See supra note 30 (outlining the differing sentencing
schemes).
40. WilliamJ. Genego et al., Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing
Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 817-833 (1975) (discussing the review powers of the
United States Parole Board and the process for release).
41. Id.
42. Andrew Von Hirsch, The Sentencing Commission's Functions, in THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 3-4 (1987).
43. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1687 (1992).
44. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
45. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Agency Cost Analysis of the Sentencing
Reform Act: Recalling the Virtues of Delegating Complex Decisions, 25 U.C. DAviS L.R.
659, 669-672 (1992). See also, Freed, supra note 43, at 1687-88.
46. Freed, supra note 43, at 1687.
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tainty. In the end, personal preferences of individual judges
often represented the overriding factors in determining the
length of a sentence.47
Even more damaging to uniformity was the uncertainty sur-
rounding parole. Judges, hoping time served would not be
unreasonably reduced, would try to factor parole into a sen-
tence.48 Unfortunately, the sentence could not be amended if
this estimation proved faulty. As a result, offenders guilty of only
minor crimes might be sentenced to a lengthy term, and similarly
situated defendants might receive substantially different
sentences, depending on how the judge viewed the purposes of
punishment or the availability of parole.49 Some of these
sentences appeared to be overly severe, and because accounting
for parole in a sentence was not on the record, the sentence was
not appealable on that ground.
50
By returning to mandatory minimum statutes, legislators
sought to structure the sentencing process so as to eliminate dis-
parity and uncertainty and to improve and refine the entire sys-
tem.51 Congress also sought to ensure that incorrigible offenders
would not return to the streets after serving only a small portion
of their sentence due to model behavior while in prison. By
1983, 49 of the 50 states had enacted their own mandatory mini-
mum provisions.5" Federal mandatory minimum statutes contin-
ued to multiply, with their focus being drug offenses, violent
crime, and serious felonies.5"
A. How Mandatory Minimums Work
Mandatory minimums appear in a variety of statutes span-
ning a host of criminal activity. Some of these statutes impose a
single sentence for a given offense, such as life imprisonment for
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1688.
49. Id. at 1685. For example, if the purpose is to rehabilitate an offender,
a shorter sentence may be imposed than if the purpose is to deter through
severity of the sentence. If parole is a factor added to this consideration, the
variations are compounded.
50. Id. at 1688.
51. Id.
52. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
53. Id. See also Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 set up a series of mandatory minimums for drug offenses that
tied the sentence to the amount of drugs involved). See also the Omnibus Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4393-94 (1988). The
Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, H.R. 1400, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 Cong.
Rec. 1669 (1991), also provided a substantial increase in mandatory minimum
statutes.
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first degree murder,' some impose both a prison term and a
fine, and others impose a mandatory range of sentences. 55 One
federal mandatory minimum statute provides that for the first
offense of simple possession of a controlled substance which has
a cocaine base and weighs more than 5 grams, the minimum
prison sentence is five years and the maximum sentence is twenty
years.56 Upon a motion by the prosecution, however, the sen-
tence imposed can be lowered for "substantial assistance."57 If
the defendant assists the government in the investigation or pros-
ecution of other individuals, the statutory minimum can be
reduced.58 This is the only exception available to a defendant
and depends upon whether the defendant is, in fact, able to
assist the government, and whether the prosecution is willing to
bring such a motion.
Mandatory minimum statutes also contain sentence
enhancement provisions, which are triggered by the presence of
certain circumstances of the offense or offender. Some of these
provisions require a lengthier sentence if a weapon is used dur-
ing the offense. In the above example, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A)
adds five years prison time, in addition to the mandatory mini-
mum term, if a weapon or explosive is used during the commis-
sion of the offense. 59 Sentences are also enhanced if the
offender has a prior criminal history,6 0 if the crime involves a
vulnerable victim or a substantial risk of bodily harm to others,6 1
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1988).
55. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 414 (1994) (5 days or fine or both for trespassing
on federal land for hunting or shooting).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1989).
57. Mueller, supra note 20, at 230. What qualifies as "substantial" requires
a factual determination by the sentencing judge. There are a variety of factors
which are to be considered, such as how much information was provided, the
usefulness of that information, or the timeliness of the assistance.
58. Id.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 844(b) (1) (A) (1989).
60. Recidivist or "three-strikes" statutes greatly enhance the penalties
imposed on career criminals and repeat offenders. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.42 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (increased prison terms for repeat
offenders); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/5-33-1 and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730,
para. 5/5-5-3 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995) (certain repeat offenders given
harsher penalties); and N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 70.04-10 (McKinney 1987 & Supp.
1995) (increasing both maximum and minimum penalties for repeat
offenders).
61. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.9(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995)
(providing a two year sentence enhancement if the offender has a prior
conviction and the victim is over the age of 65, blind, paraplegic, quadriplegic,
or under the age of 14).
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or if a certain amount of drugs are present.62 Additionally, cer-
tain categories of offenses are given lengthier sentences if they
involve a crime that society views as particularly intolerable, such
as sex offenses committed by a day-care provider.6"
A problem in uniformity of sentencing arises, however,
when certain communities consider a particular offense to be
especially threatening to their citizens. For example, New York
may consider drugs a much greater problem than do other
states, where different offenses are more prevalent. In this situa-
tion, New York's drug laws are likely to be much harsher and
more far-reaching than those of those other states. Similarly situ-
ated defendants may then receive more severe and lengthy
sentences in New York than they would have elsewhere. Of
course, unless the Federal Constitution is interpreted to allow
state sentences to be dictated by a central body so as to achieve
uniformity, some disparity between the states in sentencing is to
be expected and is also desirable. Different states must have the
ability to react to the crimes that are particularly prevalent in
their areas, and a crucial componant of American federalism
must be preserved. The trade-off however, is that inter-state uni-
formity in sentencing can not be a realistic goal of a determinate
sentencing scheme, especially when each state enacts its own
mandatory minimums statutes.
Mandatory minimums have other undesirable effects as a
result of their normal operation. First, mandatory minimums
have a "tariff-like" approach to sentencing. 64 A tariff sentence is
like a flat tax - imposed almost equally on anyone who commits
the proscribed criminal conduct (or in the case of the flat tax,
anyone who falls within the applicable income range).
Mandatory minimums equate a particular punishment with a
given offense and do not take account of gradations in offense
seriousness or in the culpability of the offender. Second,
mandatory minimums often result in sharp "cliffs" in sentences
based on small differences in offense conduct or criminal his-
tory.6" Sentence cliffs have the opposite effects of tariffs. Instead
of grouping dissimilar defendants together and imposing the
same sentence on them all, mandatory minimums can draw too
62. E.g., under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1989), when the quantity of drugs
increases from five grams to 500 grams or more, the statute enhances the term
from a minimum of five years to a maximum of forty. When the weight is five
kilograms or more, the mandatory minimum becomes ten years imprisonment
to a maximum of life.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 674 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
64. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 27-35.
65. Id.
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fine a distinction between offenders who are not significantly dis-
similar. The "cliff" is the sharp increase in sentence length for
relatively insignificant differences in offense seriousness.
Mandatory minimums commonly account for only one (or
sometimes two) factors in determining the seriousness of an
offense.' For example, with many drug crimes, only one
offense-related factor determines whether or not a mandatory
minimum statute applies.67 This factor is the weight or amount
of the drug.68 Other considerations, such as whether the
offender played a substantial role in the offense, used a weapon,
harmed a victim, or accepted responsibility play no role in sen-
tencing that offender. As a result, offenders who are significantly
different in their participation in the offense or criminal histo-
ries may receive the same sentence.
On the opposite side of the tariff problem lies the cliff effect
- defendants who do not differ significantly in the seriousness
of their offense conduct or criminal histories may receive sub-
stantially different sentences. 69 In some cases, mandatory mini-
mums fail to distinguish between offenders, and in others, they
distinguish too much. For example, the mandatory minimum
provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) produces a sentencing cliff of 25
years between a defendant convicted of robbing a bank with an
unloaded gun and a defendant who robbed a bank with a toy
gun.7 Though the culpability of the offenders, the offense, and
the effect on the victims are the same, mandatory minimums
would sentence the first offender to 25 years more than the
second.
B. Mandatory Minimums, Recidivist Statutes, and the Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Requirement
Closely related to mandatory minimums are recidivist or
"three strikes and you're out" statutes.7" Recidivist statutes are
66. Id. at 27.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). In this case, the
defendant was convicted of possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine and
sentenced to life imprisonment under a Michigan mandatory minimum statute.
For a more detailed analysis of this case, see infra notes 110-132 and
accompanying text.
69. Id. at 31.
70. This example is borrowed from the MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES
REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
71. Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out" - Mandatory Life
Imprisonment for Third Time Felons, 20 DAYTON L. REv. 717 (1995). See also,
Robert Heglin, Note, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: "Three-Strikes-and-
You're-Out," 20J. LEGis. 213 (1994).
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also part of the "get tough on crime" mentality of the American
electorate and impose a mandatory life sentence for an offender
who commits a third, and sometimes a fourth, violent offense.7"
"[T]he clamor from the public for political leaders to 'do some-
thing' . . . reached a fever pitch.., in 1994 ... ."" Against the
backdrop of heightened pressure for harsher, lengthier penal-
ties, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. TM This statute is the first federal
"three-strikes" law to be enacted, and imposes a life sentence for
a defendant convicted in federal courts of a serious violent felony
if that person has two or more final convictions for a serious vio-
lent felony or one prior conviction for a serious drug offense and
one or more convictions for a serious violent felony.75
The Supreme Court has had occasion to address the issue of
whether mandatory minimums and recidivist statutes violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Several convicted offenders have argued that their
sentences were "grossly disproportionate" to their crimes, and
ultimately, to their culpability, and that they therefore consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. In most of these cases the Court has found
that the sentences imposed under a mandatory minimum or
recidivist statute were not cruel and unusual by reason of their
alleged disproportionality. The first of these cases involved a
state recidivist statute, and highlighted the federalism concerns
necessarily implicated when a state sentence becomes subject to
federal review.
72. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1995); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(A)-
(C) (1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-13-101 (West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3 (Smith-
Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 1994); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 70.04-10 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.11(B) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 51 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (1995); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
12.42 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); Wvo. STAT. § 6-10-201 (1995); and on the
federal level, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 to 1955 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559 (c)) (1994).
73. Heglin, supra note 71, at 213.
74. Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-1955 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3559
(c)) (1994).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (c) (2) (F) (ii) (1994). The offenses must occur on
separate occasions and be separated by a conviction. A "serious violent felony"
is one punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another or that, by its nature involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense. I&
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1. The Rummel Case
The Texas statute at issue in Rummel v. Estelle76 imposed a
mandatory life sentence with a possibility of parole for a third
non-violent felony conviction. The defendant, William Rummel,
had been convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses,
which was his third felony conviction. He had previously been
convicted of obtaining $80 with a stolen credit card and $28.36
by forging a check. As required by the statute, the court sen-
tenced Rummel to life imprisonment.
Rummel challenged his sentence as excessive and dispropor-
tionate, and argued that the recidivist statute, as applied, was
unconstitutional. Rummel had been sentenced in a state court,
and his direct appeals and subsequent collateral attacks on his
sentence were rejected by the Texas appellate courts. Rummel
then sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, which was
granted. The federal district court and the court of appeals
rejected the argument that his sentence was cruel and unusual
punishment, and Rummel appealed to the Supreme Court.
Rummel claimed that a life sentence was so disproportionate to
the crimes he had committed that his rights under the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause had been
violated.7 7 Rummel cited Weems v. United States78 in support of
his argument that all punishments had to be reviewed for pro-
portionality. The Court, however, distinguished Weems based on
the uniqueness and severity of the punishment imposed in that
case. 79 For sentences other than capital punishment or cases of
extremely obvious disproportionality, ° the Court left sentence
lengths as a matter for legislatures to decide. In a now famous
quote, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, stated that
"... one could argue without fear of contradiction by any deci-
sion of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classi-
fiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of
imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative."'"
76. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). See also, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West
1994 & Supp. 1995).
77. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267.
78. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
79. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. In Weems, the punishment imposed was
cadena temporal - hard labor, confinement, and life-long civil disabilities. He
received 15 years imprisonment in hard labor with chains for two false entries
in a customs book. Id.
80. See Rumme4 445 U.S. at 275.
81. Id. at 274.
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Rummel then argued that in other cases such as Coker v.
Georgia,8 2 the Court had undertaken a proportionality review
which had been guided by objective criteria.8 3 Rummel rea-
soned that because the Court had conducted proportionality
reviews in capital punishment cases such as Coker, the Court
therefore was able to, and should, conduct such reviews for terms
of imprisonment. He asserted that the Court had several objec-
tive criteria by which the proportionality of his sentence could be
judged, such as the fact that his crime did not involve violence,
that no other state punished repeat offenders as harshly as Texas,
and that the amounts involved were "small."84 Nevertheless, the
Court distinguished Coker in that it involved capital punishment,
stating that a "bright line" existed between capital punishment
and other "permutations and commutations of punishments
short of that ultimate sanction."83 The Court stated that the cri-
teria cited by Rummel were not dispositive of the disproportion-
ality of Rummel's sentence, and were in fact, highly subjective
criteria that turned upon the viewpoints of the individual jus-
tices.8" The Court flatly rejected Rummel's argument that dis-
proportionality would be established if Texas punished repeat
offenders more harshly than any other state, saying that such an
outcome is virtually inevitable under a federal system of govern-
ment.87 The Court validated the proposition that it was the prov-
ince of the state legislature and not the federal courts to
determine appropriate sentence lengths for defendants found
guilty of state law felonies.
Justice Rehnquist drew another distinction between Rum-
mel's case and those involving capital punishment or life
sentences. He reasoned that because Rummel had the possibility
of parole within 10-12 years of conviction, his sentence was not
comparable to the capital punishment cases, which represented
82. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See Rumme4 445 U.S. at 295.
83. The objective factors cited in Coker were taken from three different
sources. The first factor that the court in Coker considered was the nature and
gravity of the offense. This factor was taken from the case of Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 179-180. The second factor, how similar offenders are sentenced
in other jurisdictions, was taken from Weems, 217 U.S. at 380. The third factor
that the Coker court relied upon was how other offenders are sentenced in the
same jurisdiction. This factor also came from Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81.
84. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 277-281. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[a]bsent a
constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of
federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular
offenders more severely than any other State." Id. at 282.
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the ultimate and permanent interference with personal liberty.88
The Court upheld the policy behind recidivist statutes which
sought to deal harshly with habitual offenders who have repeat-
edly shown that they are incapable of conforming to the norms
of society. 9 In a sharply divided opinion, the Court held that
the Texas repeat offender statute, as applied, did not impose
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, even though life imprisonment was imposed for a
third non-violent, property-related offense.9"
Justice Powell authored the dissent in Rummel, and strongly
disagreed with the majority.91 Powell opined that the Court was
able to, and in fact ought to, make conclusions about the propor-
tionality of a sentence in cases other than capital cases or cases
of extremely unusual punishment. He summarized his opinion
as follows:
(i) the penalty for a noncapital offense may be unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate, (ii) the possibility of parole
should not be considered in assessing the nature of the
punishment, (iii) a mandatory life sentence is grossly dis-
proportionate as applied to [the] petitioner, and (iv) the
conclusion that this petitioner has suffered a violation of
his Eighth Amendment rights is compatible with principles
of judicial restraint and federalism.92
Justice Powell found nothing in Cokerwhich limited proportional-
ity reviews only to capital punishment cases. He then went
through the three objective factors with a broad analysis and
found that the objective criteria established disproportionality.9 s
Because the crime did not involve violence or large sums of
money, he found that the nature and gravity of the offense, the
first objective factor, worked in Rummel's favor. He then rea-
soned that since no other state imposed a mandatory life sen-
tence upon the third nonviolent property-related offense, the
Texas statute was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Finally,
upon a comparison of how other criminals were punished in
Texas, Justice Powell concluded that Rummel's punishment was
grossly disproportionate to his crime. He reached this conclu-
88. Id. at 280-281.
89. Id. at 284.
90. Id. The majority included Justice Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, White
and Blackmun. A concurring opinion was written by Justice Stewart. The
dissenting opinion was written by Justice Powell who was joined by Justice
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
91. Id. at 285-307 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 286-287 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. See supra note 83 (setting forth the three objective factors).
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sion because all three-time felons receive the same sentence
under the statute, regardless of the nature of the underlying
offense. Powell concluded that to punish Rummel as severely as
someone who had committed three successive violent offenses
was not only disproportionate but unjust.
2. The Hutto and Solem Cases
Two years after Rumme, the Court again was confronted with
the appropriateness of conducting a proportionality review of
prison sentences under the Eighth Amendment. In Hutto v.
Davis,94 Huey Davis had been convicted in a Virginia state court
of possessing with intent to distribute and distribution of nine
ounces of marihuana. For this offense, Davis was sentenced to
forty years in prison pursuant to the provisions of the Virginia
code of criminal law.95 Davis challenged the sentence, arguing
that the sentence was so grossly disproportionate to his offense
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court
and court of appeals in Virginia held in Davis' favor and granted
him habeas corpus relief, but the Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts' judgment. The Court held that it was error to
review legislatively mandated prison terms for proportionality
except in rare cases, and that by analyzing Davis' case in light of
the objective factors expressly rejected in Rumml,96 the lower
courts "ignored... the hierarchy of the federal court system cre-
ated by the Constitution and Congress."
97
Just one year later, the issue of proportionality for terms of
imprisonment again came before the Supreme Court. In Solem v.
Helm,9" Jerry Helm was convicted under a recidivist statute and
sentenced to life imprisonment. He was convicted of issuing a
"no account" check for $100, and he had six prior felony convic-
tions.99 Helm applied to a federal district court for habeas corpus
94. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Michie 1988).
96. In Hutto, the Court rejected the four part test that the District Court
had used to assess the proportionality of Davis' sentence. The District Court
had used four objective factors taken from the case of Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d
136 (Ca 1973). (Three of these four objective factors had been rejected by the
Rummel court, though taken from different case law). The four Hart factors
included the three used in Coker, and in addition, required the reviewing court
to examine the purposes behind the statute and the existence of less restrictive
means of effectuating those purposes. See Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373-74 n.2.
97. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374-75.
98. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
99. Id. at 281. The usual maximum penalty for this offense, by itself, is
five years and a $5000 fine. Id. He had previously been convicted three times
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relief challenging the constitutionality of his sentence under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.1"' The district court, noting Rummel v. Fstelle, °1 denied
relief, but the court of appeals reversed, finding Helm's case dis-
tinguishable from that of Rummel's °2 Solem then brought his
case before the Supreme Court.
The Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed, and
that prison sentences are also subject to a proportionality review,
guided by objective criteria.103 The Court then went through the
three objective criteria from Coker and found that because
Helm's crime was among those considered less serious, did not
involve violence or large amounts of money, and because none
were against a person (as opposed to property), a sentence of life
imprisonment was disproportionate to his crime.104 Justice Pow-
ell, now writing for the 5-4 majority, stated that Solem was distin-
guishable from Rummel because Rummel was sentenced to life
with the possibility of parole after 12 years.105 In South Dakota,
where Helm was convicted, there was no such possibility and
therefore, the Court concluded that Helm's sentence was far
for third degree burglary, once for obtaining money under false pretenses,
once for grand larceny, and once for third-offense driving while intoxicated. Id.
at 279-80.
100. Id. at 283.
101. Rumme, 445 U.S. at 263.
102. Id at 283-284. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rummel.
103. Id. at 303. The Court, however, noted in its opinion that substantial
deference should be granted to the legislature and trial courts in determining
the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the sentencer. The
Court went on to say, though, that despite this deference,"... no penalty is per se
constitutional." Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
104. Justice Powell wrote that:
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence to
determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying objective
criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate sentence for
relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more harshly
than other criminals in the State who have committed more serious
crimes. He has been treated more harshly than he would have been in
any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State.
Id. at 30.
105. Id. at 297. The majority in this case now included Justice Powell,
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Id. at 279. It is important to note
that the reason for the switch in the Court's position is largely the result of
Justice Blackmun's vote. In Rummel, (also a 5-4 decision), he had voted against
conducting proportionality reviews of prison sentences. Here, in Solem, he cast
his vote in favor of such review. In neither case did he give any reasons for his
vote.
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more severe than the life sentence in Rummel. Moreover, Powell
considered that in forty-eight of the fifty states, Helm would not
have received such a harsh sentence. This analysis had been
expressly rejected by the majority in Rummel, which stated that it
was the province of the state legislators to assess and arrive at an
appropriate sentence length.10
Again as in Rummel, there was a highly critical dissenting
opinion, this time authored by Chief Justice Burger.107 He dis-
cussed the subjective nature of the factors used in Coker and Rum-
mel, and rejected the use of those factors to determine the
proportionality of sentences other than those involving capital
punishment. Burger also wrote that the Eighth Amendment did
not authorize federal courts to review state sentences of impris-
onment to determine whether or not they were disproportionate
to the crime.' 08 He stated that "[d]rawing lines between differ-
ent sentences of imprisonment would thrust the Court inevitably
'into the basic line-drawing process that is pre-eminently the
province of the legislature' and produce judgments that were no
more than the visceral reactions of individual justices. "109
3. The Harmelin Case
Indicating the lack of consensus among the Justices, the
Court again reversed its position on proportionality reviews in
Harmelin v. Michigan."' Harmelin did not involve a recidivist stat-
ute - the defendant was sentenced under a mandatory mini-
mum drug statute. Nevertheless, the principles of
proportionality review have equal force in the case of mandatory
minimums. Recidivist statutes are little more than a subset of
mandatory minimums, and the arguments set forth in Solem and
Rummel have direct bearing on proportionality challenges to
mandatory minimums. In Harmelin, the defendant, Ronald
Harmelin, was convicted under Michigan law of possessing more
than 650 grams of cocaine, and was sentenced to a mandatory
life prison term without possibility of parole.1" His conviction
was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which held that
his sentence was not cruel and unusual within the meaning of
106. See supra text accompanying note 80.
107. Solem, 463 U.S. at 304. Chief Justice Burger authored the dissent,
and was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
108. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 308 (quoting Rumme 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
110. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
111. Id. at 961.
410 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
the Eighth Amendment.11 The Michigan Supreme Court
denied his leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Harmelin asserted that his sentence was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, and therefore unconstitu-
tional, because: (1) it was significantly disproportionate to his
crime; and (2) because the sentencing judge was statutorily
required to impose it, without taking into account the circum-
stances surrounding his particular crime and background. 1 '
The Supreme Court issued an extremely divided opinion in
Harmelin. The opinion contained four parts, only one of which
was a majority opinion,'14 and the majority opinion only
addressed whether the sentencing judge was required to take
into account the circumstances surrounding his particular crime
and background before imposing a mandatory sentence. In sup-
port of his arguments, Harmelin cited Woodson v. North Caro-
lina,"' in which the Court held that the character of the
offender and circumstances of the offense were a "constitution-
ally indispensable part" of the process of sentencing someone to
death." 6 Harmelin asked the Court to extend that holding to an
"individualized mandatory-life-in-prison-without-parole sentenc-
ing doctrine" and to require a sentencing court to consider miti-
gating factors before imposing a mandatory sentence. 117 The
112. Id.
113. Id. at 961-962.
114. Id. at 960. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court in Part TV,
and was joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. He
authored an opinion for Parts I, II, and III and was joined byJustice Rehnquist.
Justice White wrote for the dissent, and was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens. Justice Marshall also wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Stevens,
who was joined by Justice Blackmun.
115. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
116. Id. at 281. Later cases have clarified and limited this holding, and
have held that there is no comparative proportionality review required by an
appellate court in every capital case. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The
Court in Pulley further held that although some schemes for proportionality
review are constitutional, that review was not necessarily indispensable. Id.
Additionally, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court stated that:
The concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a
carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate informanon and guidance. As a general proposition,
these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of all the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with
standards to guide its use of the information.
Id at 195. No requirement of comparative review was mentioned in the
opinion.
117. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995.
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Court refused to require an individualized proportionality
requirement for mandatory prison sentences, and affirmed
Harmelin's conviction." 8 The Court stated that mandatory pen-
alties and severe prison sentences may be cruel, but they were
not unusual in the Constitutional sense, based on their frequent
and extensive use throughout history.' 19 Therefore, Rummel's
argument that it would be cruel and unusual to impose a
mandatory life sentence without any consideration of "mitigat-
ing" factors, such as the absence of a prior conviction, failed to
convince the Court to require such a consideration.
Elsewhere in his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia addressed
the more general issue of whether sentences of imprisonment
were subject to a proportionality review under the Eighth
Amendment. Part I of Justice Scalia's opinion was a lengthy his-
torical analysis of the "usualness" of imprisonment and its use
throughout the centuries, and he stated that proportionality
reviews of prison sentences were an ". . . invitation to an imposi-
tion of subjective values." 2 ° Justice Scalia stated that based on a
historical analysis of the Eighth Amendment, the cruel and unu-
sual clause contained no proportionality guarantee, and that
therefore the defendant's sentence could not be considered
unconstitutionally disproportionate.1 ' Scalia's opinion was
directly contrary to Solem - in fact he stated that Solem's decision
was "simply wrong,"' and he opined that the cruel and unusual
clause was intended as a check only on the various modes of pun-
ishment. 2 In Part III, Scalia wrote that the Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the
sentence, but instead forbids only very extreme sentences which
were grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. 2 4 He
stated that "[t] he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet, whereby a
118. "We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at
capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further." Id. at 996.
119. Id. at 994-995.
120. Id. at 986 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 962-994 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 965 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
123. Id. at 985 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia stated in Part
II of his plurality opinion that while the decision on whether or not a particular
mode of punishment was cruel or unusual is relatively clear, proportionality was
not such an easy call to make. "This is not to say that there are no absolutes;
one can imagine extreme examples that no rational person, in no time or
place, could accept. But for the same reason these examples are easy to decide,
they are certain never to occur." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985-986. See also id. at
981-982.
124. Id. at 990-994 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Scalia wrote that it
would not be fair to say that there was no proportionality requirement in the
Eighth Amendment; rather he stated that this review was limited to cases
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temporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime fixes a
permanent constitutional maximum, disabling the States from
giving effect to altered beliefs and responding to changed social
conditions."125 Thus, although the majority of Justices did not
agree on whether or not proportionality reviews were required by
the Eighth Amendment, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, laid the groundwork for the argument that propor-
tionality reviews are not required, except in capital cases or cases
of extremely unusual punishment.
Justice Kennedy authored an opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.12 6 He supported adherence to a very narrow propor-
tionality principle that also had application in cases of noncapital
punishments.127 He acknowledged that the determination of
prison terms was primarily a function of the legislature, and that
the individual state legislatures could differ in the penalties
imposed for the same offense.1 28 Justice Kennedy also agreed
with the statement that proportionality reviews should be guided
by objective criteria to the maximum extent possible. 12 9 How-
ever, he ultimately concludes that "[t]he Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sen-
tence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly
disproportionate' to the crime."'3 ° Justice Kennedy then
examined Harmelin's sentence in light of those principles and
concluded that his sentence was not grossly disproportionate to
his crime. He reasoned that intrajurisdictional and interjurisdic-
tional comparisons between sentences (two of the three objective
factors) were "appropriate only in the rare case in which a
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,"131
involving capital punishment or the extreme cases like Weems v. United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 990 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 996-1008.
127. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
128. Id. at 997-998 (Kennedy,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
129. Id. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (Justice Kennedy analyzed Harmelin using the factors set forth in
Rummel and Coker).
130. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
288, 303 (1983)) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
131. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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and that an analysis of the gravity and nature of Harmelin's
offense compared to his sentence was sufficient to refute a claim
of disproportionality. 3 2
The dissent was led this time by Justice White, who inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment to include a proportionality
review in mandatory minimum cases, as well as death penalty
cases.1 3 1 What is perhaps best exemplified by the trio of Rummel,
Solem, and Harmelin is that no strong consensus exists as to the
appropriateness of a proportionality review, or what factors, if
any, should be considered when conducting such a review. Some
judges openly refuse to sentence under "three-strikes" statutes or
mandatory minimums, and put offenders who are not targeted
by the statutes in prison." 4 To these judges, three strikes legisla-
tion represents a further impingement upon the remaining areas
of their discretion, already restricted by mandatory minimums
and sentencing guidelines. These statutes, they argue, sacrifice
fairness and proportionality to convey a politically charged
message - that Americans will not tolerate being the victims of
violent crime. If the actual number of crimes committed were to
decrease as a result of mandatory minimums or "three-strikes"
laws, this message might carry some weight behind it. Unfortu-
nately, the crime rate has remained about the same since 1970,
one indication that deterrent effects of mandatory minimums
have not been as widespread as Congress and state legislators had
hoped." 5 Additionally, in its Special Report to the Congress, the
U.S. Sentencing Commission determined that in approximately
35% of all cases in which a mandatory minimum statute could
have been supported by the evidence, the defendants pled guilty
to charges carrying non-mandatory sentences or a reduced
132. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
133. Id. at 1009-1027 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Mandatory minimums were designed to severely punish mid-to high-
level participants in a crime. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra
note 7, at 9-10. For examples of judges who have refused to sentence under
both state and federal three-strikes laws, see Anne Krueger, S.D. Judge Criticized
for Ignoring Three-Strikes Law, The San Diego Union-Tribune, June 30, 1995 at
B 1; Harriet Chiang, Judges Can't Defy 'Three-Strikes'Law: Ruling Restricts Sentencing
Options, The San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1995 at A19; Bill Kisliuk, DA's
'Three-Strikes' Appeal Takes the Cake, The Recorder, July 20, 1995 at 3. See also,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM
TwENTY YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME VICTIMS, THE NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, 1973-92 7 (1993).
135. Heglin, supra note 71. See also, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME
VICTIMS, THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, 1973-92 7 (1993).
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mandatory penalty.136 That the mandatory statutes are not being
charged in cases where they are applicable suggests that "tough
on crime" politics, though appealing in theory, have a signifi-
cantly diluted effect in practice.
In an effort to avoid the problem of disproportionate
sentences, the federal sentencing guidelines impose severe pen-
alties on habitual offenders only when the underlying offense
involves violence or controlled substances.137 Under the guide-
lines, a defendant convicted of kidnapping with two prior convic-
tions for violent felonies or drug offenses receives approximately
thirty years of imprisonment. A defendant convicted of assault
with two prior convictions receives, on the average, about six
years. The guidelines provide for distinctions in the severity of
the offense, whereas "three-strikes" statutes would place both
these defendants in prison for life.1"
Some critics have protested recidivist statutes on grounds of
fairness, explaining that "three-strikes" laws could often be over-
inclusive. 3 9 This situation arises in cases where a defendant may
have numerous non-violent felonies such as a stolen credit card
or forging a check. Prosecutors have also criticized recidivist stat-
utes, stating that there was "no reliable way to identify violent
criminal predators from their official records, which is what
'three-strikes' proposals would automatically do." 40 When Con-
gress and state legislators enacted recidivist statutes and
mandatory minimums, defendants like Rummel were not among
those meant to be targeted. Mandatory minimums, especially for
drug crimes, were meant to target mid- to high-level participants
in a drug operation.141 Similarly, recidivist statutes were
136. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, summary.
137. Allyn G. Heald, U.S. v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningful
Proportionality Principle, 58 BROOKLYN L. REv. 455, 465 n.35 (1992). See also,
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1 (1994-
1995) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
138. Taifa, supra note 71, at 721.
139. Heglin, supra note 71, at 225-26. For example, Heglin notes that
under traditional three-strikes legislation, a three-time petty thief could be
sentenced to life in prison. Considering that three-strikes laws were meant
target those who repeatedly committed violent crimes or drug offenses, the
three-strikes laws are inappropriately used when applied to this three-time petty
theif. Other statutes may carry penalties more commensurate with the offense
committed. Additionally, a three-time offender who committed two crimes
early in his life and then committed a third, unrelated offense thirty years later
would also be sentenced to life in prison under three-strikes laws. It would be
inaccurate to label this person a "career offender" and punish him as such. Id.
140. Taifa, supra note 71 at 723.
141. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
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designed to combat the most serious of crimes, and imprison
those who repeatedly preyed upon innocent citizens.
It is this aspect of these harsh, mandatory statutes that has
led prosecutors to avoid charging defendants like Rummel for
being repeat offenders, and instead engage in "charge-shopping"
until a more appropriate charge can be found. For example,
under discretionary repeat offender laws in Illinois, prosecutors
charged only eighty-eight people in fifteen years, 142 indicating a
reluctance to eliminate discretionary sentencing and impose
overly severe punishments. These practices of "charge-shopping"
by prosecutors creates the potential for defendants to plead
guilty to lesser, "non-violent" offenses in order to avoid the appli-
cation of three-strikes or mandatory minimum legislation. Prose-
cutors who are unwilling to impose what they believe are overly
harsh sentences may accept plea bargains and manipulate facts
to avoid the statutes.
143
Recidivist statutes are closely linked, both in theory and in
practice, to mandatory minimums. The complaints against recid-
ivist statutes echo those made against mandatory minimums and
cause many of the same problems of disparity, manipulation and
disproportionality in sentencing. Though recidivist statutes pose
difficult problems for sentencers, as evidenced by the lack of con-
sensus among the Supreme CourtJustices, they are not the focus
of this inquiry. Instead, they remain useful illustrations of some
of the issues and problems surrounding proportionality review
and the difficulties associated with finding an acceptable way to
link culpability with time served. Congress tried to solve these
same problems by enacting mandatory minimums, which were
originally thought to provide such a link. The Supreme Court
cases have shown that not only is such a link impossible to attain,
but if some rough commensurability between blameworthiness
and punishment were possible, mandatory minimum statutes
would not be the ideal connection between the two.
IV. THE FAILURE OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS TO IMPROVE
THE SYSTEM
Mandatory minimums simply have not met the goals envi-
sioned by Congress and the public.'" Criticisms have focused on
142. Taifa, supra note 71, at 723.
143. Id.
144. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 14-16.
These goals included: (1) retribution or ensuring the offender has received his
or her just deserts; (2) deterrence and certainty in the punishment to be
imposed; (3) incapacitation - removing dangerous individuals from society at
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several main points: (1) mandatory minimums still do not fit the
punishment to the crime and the offender's culpability;145 (2)
they result in prison overcrowding; 4 6 (3) they transfer sentenc-
ing discretion from the court to the prosecutor;' 47 (4) they moti-
vate judges to find loopholes in mandatory sentencing; 148 and
(5) mandatory minimums are inconsistent with Congress' deci-
sion to delegate sentencing authority to a sentencing commission
of experts.
A. Mandatory minimums do not relate the punishment to the
culpability of the offender
Mandatory minimums have drawn heavily from a retributive
philosophy of punishment that seeks to punish an offender only
because he or she has committed an offense. There need not be,
and should not be, any justification for the punishment other
than the conduct of the offender. 49 Herbert Packer, who may
properly be called a "limiting retributivist,"' 50 writes that punish-
ment should be imposed upon those who deserve it by reason of
their criminal conduct, but that their culpability should serve as
the upper limit on that punishment. 15' Traditionally, retribution
has been included as one of the main purposes of punish-
ment,152 yet mandatory minimums commonly do not connect
culpability with time served. To the extent that defendants are
large; (4) removing disparity from sentencing so that similarly situated
offenders would receive similar sentences; (5) inducement of cooperation with
authorities; and (6) inducement of guilty pleas.
145. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 27, 34.
146. Lowenthal, supra note 22, at 71 n.49.
147. Freed, supra note 43, at 1686-1687.
148. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 102,
103, 107.
149. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 9-10
(1968). "[M]an is a responsible moral agent to whom rewards are due when he
makes right moral choices and to whom punishment is due when he makes
wrong ones ... [T]hese imperatives flow from the nature of man and do not
require - indeed do not permit - any pragmatic justification." Id. at 9.
150. See infra notes 369-372 and accompanying text.
151. PACKER, supra note 149, at 65-70. Packer writes,
I see an important limiting principle in the criminal law's traditional
emphasis on blameworthiness as a prerequisite to the imposition of
punishment. But it is a limitingprinciple, not ajustification for action.
It is wrong to say that we should punish persons simply because they,
commit offenses under circumstances that we call blameworthy. It is
right to say that we should not punish those who commit offenses
unless we can say that their conduct is blameworthy.
Id. at 66.
152. Kenneth Feinberg, The Federal Guidelines and the Underlying Purposes of
Sentencing, 3 FED. SENTENCING REP. 326 (1991).
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grouped together under broad classes of offenses, mandatory
minimums fail to ensure that the punishment fits the crime.
When less restrictive punishment would be more appropriate for
a particular offender, deviations or reductions in sentence terms
are often impermissible when mandatory minimums are in
place. 153  Sentencing under mandatory minimum statutes is
based the elements of the offense charged, and only in extremely
limited situations can an offense or offender characteristic alter
the sentence length dictated by the statute. The statutes do not
permit ajudge to consider a defendant's background or whether
or not the crime involved violence, unless it is an element of the
offense. Instead, the judge is permitted to depart from the
required sentence only if the offender assists the authorities in
some way. This policy works against some individuals, who may
be penalized by not having any assistance to offer.
While a precise equation linking culpability to sentence
length is impossible to derive, an attempt should be made to cre-
ate a system that roughly measures the severity of the punish-
ment by the gravity of the offense (actual or intended). Because
mandatory minimums fall to do this, meaning is removed from
the sentencing process. By shifting the focus of sentencing
almost completely away from the offender, not only does the
criminal justice system fail to consider the culpability of the indi-
vidual, but the interests of society as well.154
B. Mandatory minimums and prison overcrowding
A problem inextricably intertwined with automatic incapaci-
tation is prison overcrowding. Mandatory minimums leave the
judge with virtually no option but to imprison an offender. And
with Congress having simultaneously abolished parole,' 55 the
multitude of federal offenders sentenced under mandatory mini-
153. Unfettered discretionary sentencing in this sense had been superior
to determinate sentencing, insofar as it had provided alternate methods of
punishment, such as supervised release and probation. The limiting
retributivist would have culpability serve as a cap on the upper limits of
punishment imposed, yet capped (capped by the level of the offender's
culpability) discretionary sentencing might require the release or a substantial
reduction in sentence length if the offender was not as culpable as the
mandatory minimum statute presumes. Mandatory minimums simply do not
permit such a consideration or limiting use of culpability.
154. These interests include safety from harm and loss of life or property,
the interests of society in rehabilitating an offender and the interests of society
in deterring other potential offenders, or that particular offender, from
committing further crimes.
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 991-998 (1988). The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act
abolished parole in all federal cases.
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mums has significantly increased prison overcrowding.156 The
most recent statistics indicate that at the end of 1994, a record
1.5 million inmates were in federal and state prisons and local
jails. 57 This amount is triple that of 1980 statistics and is
expected to increase to 7.3 million in a decade.' Since 1984,
the mean sentence expected to be served by federal offenders
for all offenses has increased from 24 months to 46 months.
159
The states have also experienced serious shortages in prison
space." ° The difference between the states and the federal sen-
tencing commission is that many of the states have used guide-
lines to their advantage.'61 Minnesota, Oregon and Washington
156. Lowenthal, supra note 22, at 71 n.49. Before the mid-70s, state and
federal prison populations fluctuated at around 200,000 inmates. Since 1974,
however, there has been a continual rise in prison populations. See NORVAL
MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE
PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 47 (1990). From 1980-1985,
the prison population increased by approximately 189%. See Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 CHIC.
L. REv. 901, 929 (1991). And for the entire decade, 1980-1989, the population
increased by 123%, with 1989 recording the largest annual growth (80,000) in
65 years. Benjamin J. Lambiotte, Retribution or Rehabilitation?: The Addict
Exception and Mandatory Sentencing After Grant v. United States and the District of
Columbia Controlled Substances Amendment Act of 1986, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 733,
736 (1988). (Part of this substantial increase may be attributed to the Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), that the
sentencing guidelines were constitutional. Many judges had refused to
sentence under the guidelines until this case was decided, and others sentenced
pending the outcome of this case). In 1990 alone, additional costs to the prison
system, from the effects of mandatory minimum sentencing, were between $79
and $125 million. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at
120.
157. Fox Butterfield, More in U.S. Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 10, 1995, at A14 (summarizing the latest report by the Justice
Department).
158. Butterfield, supra note 157.
159. Tonry, supra note 31, at 168.
160. In Alaska, between 1980 and 1990, the prison population had risen
230%. See Teresa White Cams, Sentence Reform in Alaska, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP.
134 (1993). The problem in Texas appears to be even more critical. Texas has
traditionally attempted to combat increased needs for prison space by building
more prisons. Nevertheless, a backlog exists and this backlog is projected to
reach almost 59,000 prisoners by the year 2000 if reform is not initiated. Not
only was it costly to build these facilities, but by 1991 fourteen counties had
filed suit in both state and federal court to obtain funds for inmate care, further
adding to the costs of overcrowding. See Michele Ceitch, Giving Guidelines the
Boot: The Texas Experience with Sentencing Reform, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 138
(1993). Kansas also faced ever-increasing rates of prison overcrowding. From
1979 to 1989, the prison population tripled. SeeDavidJ. Gottlieb, Kansas Adopts
Sentencing Guidelines, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 158 (1993).
161. During 1984, the Justice Department reported that the number of
inmates in Federal, state and local prisons increased by more than 1,600 per
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have tied their available and foreseeable prison resources to sen-
tencing policies.1 61 In fact, Minnesota and Washington success-
fully maintained prison populations within available prison
capacity, and experienced lower than average incarceration rate
increases, until legislative changes in the mid-80s toughened the
guidelines. 6
The lack of available prison cells has plagued the penal sys-
tem for decades and to fill available cells with first-time or non-
violent offenders is too costly and burdensome, given the scarcity
of space and funding."6 The federal prison population is facing
an estimated 119% increase between 1987 and 1997, ". . . as a
result of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and harsh
mandatory punishments for drug offenses."165 These statistics
are not intended to suggest, however, that if capacity is reached,
any new offenders should be released under judicial order.
Instead, judges could oversee prison capacity much like a spicket
does the flow of water- when capacity is reached, non-violent
offenders or those nearing the end of their term (and deter-
mined safe for release) could be let out under a supervised
release program. The decisions regarding whom to release
could be a matter for the state or federal sentencing commission
to decide and structure.
C. Sentencing discretion shifts to the prosecutor
Mandatory minimums failed to solve the problems of discre-
tionary sentencing on another level as well. Instead of removing
the adverse effects of discretion from the process, mandatory
minimums only shift them from the judge to the prosecutor.
1 66
For mandatory minimums to have any useful effects on eliminat-
ing disparity, a prosecutor must first be willing to pursue the
proper charge. Unfortunately, this is frequently not the case.
167
Prosecutors have stated often that the severity of mandatory sen-
week and there were 958, 704 inmates in state prisons at the end of 1994.
Butterfield, supra note 154.
162. Tonry, supra note 31, at 183.
163. Id. at 176.
164. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical
Appraisal 36 UCLA L. REv. 83, 103-104 (1988). See also, MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 115-120 (discussing the impact of mandatory
minimums on the federal prison population and a comparison of sentences
under the guidelines with mandatory minimums).
165. Butterfield, supra note 154.
166. Freed, supra note 43, at 1686-1687.
167. Id. at n.11.
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tencing motivated them to accept pleas to lesser offenses or
charge an offense carrying a shorter prison term."
The disparate charging practices of prosecutors raises an
issue beyond the resulting uncertainty in the system and manipu-
lation of the guidelines. These potentially discriminating poli-
cies may violate the equal protection clause of a state or the
federal constitution. In Stephens v. State,'69 a defendant with a
second conviction for the sale or possession with intent to dis-
tribute a controlled substance was sentenced to life imprison-
ment under a recidivist statute. The defendant challenged this
statute on the grounds that state prosecutors had applied the
statute discriminatorily based on race, and he proffered evidence
to demonstrate a consistent policy of discrimination by the prose-
cutors. Stephens claimed that the statute as applied violated the
equal protection clauses of both the United States and the Geor-
gia constitutions. The court found that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish a policy of prosecutorial discrimination, and
stated that "[b]ecause the district attorney in each judicial cir-
cuit exercises discretion in determining when to seek a sentence
of life imprisonment, a defendant must present some evidence
addressing whether the prosecutor handling a particular case
engaged in selective prosecution to prove a state equal protec-
tion violation."' 70
Though the court in this case found no evidence of a policy
to discriminate, the foundation was laid for future challenges to
mandatory minimums, based on selective or discriminatory appli-
cation of the statutes. However, advancing a successful equal
protection claim based on discriminatory application of
mandatory minimums may prove a difficult hurdle to overcome.
As the court in Stephens was careful to stress, prosecutorial discre-
tion must be preserved in areas such as the decisions surround-
ing whom to prosecute, what charges to bring and what
sentences to seek.'7 1 Nevertheless, should a defendant accumu-
late sufficient evidence to prove a "consistent policy of discrimi-
nation," the potential exists for sentences to be challenged as
violating the equal protection clause.
The higher standard of proof necessary to convict under
mandatory minimums may constitute yet another reason for
prosecutors to circumvent application of the statutes. In addi-
tion to a desire to pursue a mandatory minimum charge, the
168. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 101-103.
169. 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995).
170. Id. at 562.
171. Id.
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prosecutor must have the ability to meet the standard of proof
required for conviction in criminal cases - guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 17 2 Under discretionary sentencing, sentencing
factors only had to be established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, because a sentencing hearing is not an adjudicatory
stage.173 With mandatory minimums, those factors constitute the
actual elements of the offense, which must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Moreover, prosecutions of offenses carrying
mandatory minimum sentences often result in complex eviden-
tiary hearings and are more susceptible to appeal.
74
D. Judicial circumvention of mandatory minimums
The case for mandatory minimums is weakened further in
the courtroom. Studies have shown that judges, believing
mandatory minimum sentences to be too harsh, often circum-
vent the statutes.175 The judiciary has resented the encroach-
ment on their powers of discretion and interpretation of the
law.' 76 Sentencers are hesitant to impose sentences which they
believe to be unjust, and
[a] sense of justice is essential to one's participation in a
system for allocating criminal penalties. When the penalty
structure offends those charged with the daily administra-
tion of the criminal law, tension arises between the judge's
duty to follow the written law and the judge's oath to
administer justice.
1 77
When judges are faced with a choice between adhering to the law
by imposing what they believe to be an unjust sentence, and cir-
cumventing mandatory minimums by imposing a lesser sentence,
172. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
173. See Kinder v. United States, 504 U.S. 946 (1992) (in which the
Supreme Court denied cert., but in the dissenting opinion, Justice White set
forth the almost universally accepted principle that the proper standard of
proof for sentencing hearings is a preponderance of the evidence). See also, In
Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (drawing a distinction between
adjudicatory and nonadjudicatory stages in the criminal process.) By the time a
defendant is given a sentencing hearing, guilt is already established, and the
process is no longer adjudicatory. Therefore, the requisite standard of proof
for factors relevant in a sentencing hearing is proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
174. Weigel, supra note 164.
175. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 102,
103, 107, Appendix G (containing resolutions from all circuit courts seeking
repeal of mandatory minimums and voicing dissatisfaction and disfavor with
mandatory minimums).
176. Freed, supra note 43, at 1722.
177. Id. at 1686.
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the tendency to follow their conscience is strong. 178 As no one
can ever be excused from doing what he or she believes to be
just, the strength of this tendency must be maintained. But, the
hidden manipulation that occurs behind sentencing thwarts the
purposes of mandatory minimums - to eliminate uncertainty
and unwarranted disparity and to bring about "truth in sentenc-
ing." 17  All twelve circuit courts of appeals have issued resolu-
tions urging Congress to " . . . reconsider the wisdom of all
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, and to establish such
alternate policy as the Congress deems appropriate in order to
retain some degree of flexibility in the criminal sentencing
process."18 °
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments against mandatory
minimums is that the majority of the statutes are simply not used.
By 1991, approximately 100 federal mandatory minimum provi-
sions within 60 different criminal statutes existed.' Only four
statutes involving drug and weapons violations accounted for
approximately 94% of the cases.' 82 Mandatory sentences cannot
have a deterrent effect or incapacitate offenders if they represent
only empty threats.
The experience in some states with mandatory minimums
has not differed greatly from the circumvention and manipula-
tion present in the federal system. For example, back in the
1970s, the police in Boston avoided the usage of a statute calling
for mandatory one-year sentences for offenders convicted of car-
rying a gun.18 3 Instead of arresting offenders for this offense, the
police instead increased the number of weapon seizures without
arrests by 120% between 1974 and 1976.184 In New York, both
police and prosecutors avoided application of the Rockefeller
Drug Laws by charging offenders with other statutes carrying
lesser penalties.'8 5 A study found that drug felony arrests, indict-
ment rates and conviction rates all declined after the law was
178. Id.
179. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, Ch.1, pt. 3 (policy statement); MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 18. "Truth in sentencing" means
that sentences imposed are those that are actually served. The elimination of
parole from the federal system was an attempt to remove the need forjudges to
guess what the Parole Commission would do, i.e. release a defendant early, etc.
180. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, Appendix G, supra note 7,
at G-4.
181. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
182. Id at 10.
183. Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penalties, 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE 243, 252
(1992).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 257.
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effectuated. 18 6 Despite the fact that many state sentencers and
police forces avoid the application of mandatory minimums,
other states regularly employ those statutes to combat crime, and
have increased the number of mandatory minimum statutes in
their criminal codes. 18 7 Some states, California, Illinois and Indi-
ana for example, continue to employ broad determinate sentenc-
ing schemes, but this group of states is continually decreasing in
number. 188
States that have chosen to implement guideline sentencing
systems have almost uniformly moved away from determinate
sentencing and mandatory minimums, in favor of more discre-
tionary systems.18 9 When faced with decisions on sentencing
reform back in 1981, Washington opted for a guideline system,
and used three mandatory minimum statutes only as starting
points for proportionately scaling the remaining offenses.
191
Pennsylvania also decided against mandatory minimums, and
during a statewide sentencing conference in 1977 concluded that
mandatory sentencing was a poor choice to reform sentencing
because: "(1) it created blatant unfairness by treating diverse
offenders equally; (2) its provisions would be circumvented by
plea bargaining and therefore make sentencing decisions less vis-
186. Id. This effect was canceled out, however, because those convicted
were more likely to be imprisoned, and the average length of the term
imprisonment increased. Id. Judges in Detroit, Michigan also avoided applying
a statute that sentenced persons convicted of possessing a firearm to two years
in prison. The judges either acquitted the offenders of the gun charge or by
decreasing the sentence they would otherwise impose by two years to offset the
mandatory term. Id. at 253.
187. Id. at 251. Florida and Arizona are two such states.
188. See Pub. Act. No. 80-1099, 1977 Ill. Laws 3264-3318 (codified
throughout Uniform Code of Corrections ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-
1008)(1983)); and Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170 (a)(1) (West 1985). The number of states switching to a guideline
system has continually increased since 1979.
189. These "guideline" states have established sentencing commissions, a
body of experts, to promulgate a structured and guided process for sentencing,
which are mandatory in the sense that a sentencer must consult the guidelines
when sentencing. These systems preserve some discretion to the sentencer to
adjust a sentence, either upwards or downwards, if the circumstances of the
case merit such an adjustment. See infra notes 198-224 and accompanying text
for a more thorough discussion of the development of sentencing guidelines.
190. David L. Fallen, The Evolution of Good Intentions: A Summary of
Washington State's Sentencing Reform, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 147 (1993).
Washington established mandatory terms as follows: twenty years for first
degree murder, five years for first degree assault, and three years for first
degree rape. The punishments for the remaining offenses were then ranked
according to their seriousness and sentence lengths for those offenses were
scaled around the mandatory minimums.
424 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
ible; and (3) they would increase prison populations."19' For
these reasons, Pennsylvania rejected mandatory minimum
sentencing.
Prison overcrowding was the impetus behind Kansas' rejec-
tion of mandatory minimums and "get-tough-on-crime" sentenc-
ing."' In the early to mid 1980s, bills introducing a series of
mandatory minimums failed to get past even the proposal stage
in the legislature. Wisconsin also flirted with the notion of
implementing determinate, mandatory sentencing during the
late 1970s, based to some extent on California's system.' 93 By the
early 80s, however, the Special Committee on Determinate Sen-
tencing, which had been established to study California's system,
had instead begun the process for drafting guidelines based on
the Minnesota model.194 Mandatory minimums also fell into dis-
favor in Ohio and the legislature repealed most of the statutes
prescribing a mandatory sentence. 195 In the mandatory mini-
mums retained, the legislature gave the judges discretion to
choose the appropriate sentence within the sentencing ranges.
1 9 6
In this way, the mandatory terms required by the statutes were
made to fit within the guideline structure. Despite the limited
use of mandatory minimums retained by the guideline states,
and the states such as California which use determinate sentenc-
ing throughout the system, mandatory minimums have been
phased out in many areas in which they previously were the most
important sentencing tool.
E. Mandatory minimums are inconsistent with guideline sentencing
Perhaps the most confusing aspect surrounding the prolifer-
ation of mandatory minimums is the inherent inconsistency
between the sentencing schemes which Congress has chosen to
co-exist. On the one hand, Congress has sought to eliminate
unwarranted disparity in sentencing by creating a commission of
experts to solicit information on all aspects of sentencing, from a
wide variety of sources, and to create a system of sentencing
191. John H. Kramer and Cynthia Kempinen, History of Pennsylvania
Sentencing Reform, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 152 (1993).
192. Gottlieb, supra note 157, at 158.
193. Sandra Shane-DuBow, Hybrid Guidelines: The Wisconsin Experience, 6
FED. SENTENCING REP. 162, 164 (1993).
194. Id.
195. Fritz Rauschenberg, Sentencing Reform Proposals in Ohio, 6 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 166, 167 (1993).
196. Id.
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guidelines.197 Congress entrusted this Commission to promul-
gate the guidelines, and gave them the authority to refine and
revise those guidelines when necessary. Yet, despite this appar-
ent commitment to transfer sentencing decisions to this body of
experts, and the desire to preserve some discretion and flexibility
for the sentencer, Congress enacted, and is still enacting,
mandatory minimums. Mandatory minimums are directly at
odds, both in practice as well as ideologically, with sentencing
guidelines. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two
very different and contradictory approaches to sentencing.
V. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO
SENTENCING REFORM
To temper the deficiencies in mandatory minimum statutes
and to impose some constraints on fluctuations in discretionary
sentencing, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.198 This legislation created a Sentencing Commission,
which had as its task the establishment of guidelines to assist
judges in a modified and limited exercise of discretionary sen-
tencing. 99 The Commission was organized as an independent,
non-partisan body consisting of seven voting members,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and
two non-voting ex-officio members.2 °
The Commission had three primary objectives: (1) to create
certainty and honesty in sentencing; (2) to provide uniformity in
sentencing for similarly situated defendants; and (3) to link pun-
ishment with culpability. 21  It began the task of promulgating
sentencing guidelines with an analysis of past cases, specifically
focusing on which offense and offender characteristics judges
had used to determine a sentence. 2  The proposals went to
Congress in early 1987, and following the statutorily mandated
six month period of review, they became effective on November
1, 1987.3
197. This commission was established via the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, which established the United States Sentencing Commission, a body of
seven members made up of both judges, prosecutors, and others involved in
sentencing. See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
198. See generally, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
199. Id.
200. Weigel, supra note 164, at 85; see also MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
201. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
202. Id. at 19.
203. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Wich They Rest 17 HoSTRA L. REv. 1, 6 (1988).
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Sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes
were meant to address many of the same problems, but the
guidelines employed a different approach. The guidelines were
designed to structure the sentencing process to avoid a complete
abdication of judicial discretion and to enable consideration of
the circumstances particular to an individual case. Congress
believed that the guideline system could structure the decision
making process and could clearly outline the relevant factors to
be considered, thereby reducing disparity and uncertainty.
2 ° 4
The result theoretically would be the most just and proportion-
ate sentence possible.2 °5
The guidelines provided judges with substantially limited
discretion in determining a sentence.2 6 The sentence still could
be adjusted when unusual circumstances existed,20 7 but all
208departures were then subject to appellate review. This was a
compromise between a "real offense" system and a "charge
offense" system. Real offense sentencing is a method by which
the length of a sentence is based not only on the crime or crimes
for which a defendant has been convicted, but also for alleged
crimes which relate to the offense of conviction. Essentially all
available information about a defendant is properly considerable
by a sentencer. Charge offense systems permit the sentencer to
consider only evidence relating to the offense of conviction. Vir-
tually no aggravating or mitigating factors are considered. The
federal guidelines are a hybrid between these two systems. 2°9 By
structuring sentencing this way, the unique characteristics of an
offender are highlighted and treated accordingly.
In practice, the federal guideline system is much more
"mandatory" than a general set of suggestions. It represents a
detailed and specific seven step process.
204. Id. at 5. See also, U.S.S.G., supra note 137, Ch.1, PtA, intro.
comment, at 1.2.
205. Bruce M. Selya and Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging
DepartureJurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1, 5 (1991). Apparently, the states also acknowledge the merits of
sentencing guidelines, as evidenced by the 17 states which currently have
operative guidelines, and by the five other states which have established
sentencing commissions. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still
Going Strong, 78 JUDicA &mi 173, 174 (1995).
206. Breyer, supra note 203, at 8-9.
207. See, e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at §§ 5H1.1-5H1.10 (lists factors
not ordinarily relevant in departure decisions). See also id. at §§ 5K2.1-5K2.15
(for a non-exhaustive list of factors that provide a proper basis for departure).
208. Weigel, supra note 164, at 102. See also Selya and Kipp, supra note
205, at 2.
209. Selya and Kipp, supra note 205, at 9-10.
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1. Look up the statute of conviction in the statutory index.2 10
2. Find the "base offense level" for the offense.
21'
3. Add "specific offense characteristics" for value of goods
taken, weapons used, incidental crimes committed and the
like.212
4. Determine if any "adjustments" to the sentence are to be
made. Among others, these include harming victims of the
crime, the offender's role in the offense, and efforts to obstruct
* 213justice.
5. Calculate a criminal history score based on past convictions,
if any.21 4
6. Refer to a sentencing table in the guidelines and, using the
offense level score and the criminal history score, arrive at the
appropriate sentencing range.21 5
7. Impose the Guideline sentence or in the presence of unusual
factors, depart from the guideline range and impose a non-
Guideline sentence.
210. The statutory index contains a list of all federal criminal statutes by
their federal citation. A corresponding guideline section is listed for each
offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at Appendix A.
211. The "base offense level" is the sentencing commission's numerical
assessment of the seriousness of the offense of conviction. For example the
base offense level of first degree murder is 43. This number is then to be used
within the grid system. Id. at § 2Al.1.
212. Specific Offense Characteristics vary from offense to offense and
include those factors which are common attributes of that offense. These
factors, when present, establish the seriousness of the offense and either
increase or decrease the base offense level. See generally id.
213. Adjustments are found in a separate chapter of the guidelines and
differ from specific offense characteristics in that they are applicable to all
offenses. There are victim-related adjustments and adjustments for the role
the offender played in the offense, any obstruction of justice, increases for
multiple count convictions, and decreases for acceptance of responsibility. Id.
at Chapter Three.
214. A criminal history score is to calculated by totaling prior convictions.
Different convictions are assigned different scores. For example, a prior
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month increases the
criminal history score by three points, whereas a prior sentence of at least sixty
days but less than one year and one month requires two points to be added.
The result of this process is a score that is used in the grid system to determine
the applicable sentencing range. Id. at Chapter Four.
215. The criminal history categories are arranged horizontally across the
top of the sentencing grid, and the offense levels run vertically down the side of
the grid. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, Chapter Five. The range itself is the product
of substantial and extensive research of past cases and sentence patterns. The
amounts were carefully considered and structured for maximum effectiveness,
and sought to create just and proportionate sentences which met the needs of
both the individual and society. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra
note 7, chapter 3.
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An example of the application of the federal guidelines is as
follows. Consider an individual who has been convicted of bur-
glarizing a private residence. The offender was employed by the
household to take care of two small children. There was only
one occupant in the residence at the time of the offense. The
offender used her key to the house to get in, and physically
restrained the one occupant by tying him to a chair. The
offender brandished, but did not use, a firearm. The total
amount of goods taken was $8000, and this amount included a
firearm which was owned by and registered to the occupants.
The offender has two prior convictions for violations carrying
penalties of at least 60 days in prison.
. Burglary of a residence has a base offense level of 17.216 Var-
ious specific offense characteristics are listed which can affect the
base offense level. Here, the base offense level is increased by
one level because the financial loss exceeded $2500, but was less
than $10,000. There is a one level increase for the firearm taken,
and a two level increase because a dangerous weapon was pos-
sessed by the offender. This brings the base offense level up to
21. The sentencer must then determine whether any adjust-
ments are to be made to the sentence.
For the restraint of a victim, the base offense level is
increased by two levels. Other increases for crimes involving a
vulnerable or official victim are not applicable. The offender's
role in the offense must also be considered, and the abuse of
trust provision increases the base offense level by two more
points. 217 The offender was employed by the household and
entrusted with the care and safety of the occupant's children,
and the offender abused her position of trust by gaining access to
the house with the key she was given to help her perform her
duties. The base offense level is now 25. With these adjustments
made, the sentencer must determine the offender's criminal
history.
The offender is assigned two criminal history points for
every prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days. In
the above hypothetical, the offender has two such prior convic-
tions, which puts her in the second criminal history category.
With a base offense level of 25 and a criminal history score of 4,
the applicable guideline range is between 84 and 105 months.
216. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at § 2B2.1 This offense level is the starting
point for determining the applicable guideline range. Adjustments for
aggravating and mitigating factors either decrease or increase this base level.
217. Id. at § 3B1.3.
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While this procedure does usurp much of the discretion
judges previously had been free to exercise, the departure provi-
sions allow for some consideration of other factors, (aside from
specific offense characteristics and criminal history), when fash-
ioning a sentence.218 In doing so, the court must first decide
whether or not the Commission, when promulgating the guide-
lines, adequately considered the kind or degree of circumstances
in the case at hand.2 19 This determination is required irrespec-
tive of whether those circumstances are aggravating or mitigat-
ing. 22 0 The court, moreover, may make reference only to the
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commen-
tary of the Sentencing Commission.
221
The Commission recognized that it may not have created
the perfect set of guidelines. It only attempted to "establish sen-
tencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice sys-
tem that'. . . reflect, to the extent practicable, advancements in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process.' ,222 A system was contemplated that would evolve and
adapt to changes in the needs of the penal system. 223  An
amendment process therefore permits the addition, modifica-
tion or removal of guidelines, helping to ensure that they remain
current and to improve and refine the sentencing process.
224
VI. A COMPARISON OF STATE AND FEDERAL GUIDELINES
It would be a mistake to assume that the federal sentencing
guidelines were based on the state models which had been imple-
mented almost five years earlier. Significant differences exist
between the state and federal systems, and each have met with
different degrees of success and failure. In general, however,
218. Id. There are, however, several factors which the commission has
specified can not be considered as grounds for departure, even if in an atypical
case. For example, the offender's economic status, race, sex or religion can
never be considered. Nor can the offender's age, education or vocation, or
mental and emotional conditions. Id. at § 5H1.4.
219. Id. at § 5K2.0.
220. The possibility for an "adequacy" determination is often ignored by
the courts, which only serves to continue the application of guidelines that fail
to meet the needs of sentencing. Freed, supra note 43, at 1695.
221. Selya and Kipp, supra note 205, at 11.
222. Freed, supra note 43, at 1690.
223. Breyer, supra note 203, at 7. Congress intended the Commission to
continually revise and evaluate the guidelines as new data is obtained or
sentencing policies change.
224. See generally, William W. Wilkins, Jr. and John R. Steer, The Role of
Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 63 (1993).
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most proponents of guideline systems concede that the state sys-
tems have met with far greater success, and have accomplished
more of their initial goals, than the federal guidelines.225 In
fact, Texas specifically decided not to develop guidelines that
were modeled after the federal guidelines. 2 6
The main differences between state and federal systems can
be summarized as follows: (1) state guidelines employ more of a
"real offense" sentencing approach, whereas the federal system is
a hybrid between real and charge offense sentencing;227 (2) state
guidelines permit sentencers to consider substantially more
aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing; 228 (3) states
often provide more opportunity and tolerance for departures
than is present in the federal system;2 29 (4) the state sentencing
commissions all serve as the state's principal forum for sentenc-
ing policy proposals;2 ° (5) many state systems tie sentencing pol-
icy to available and/or foreseeable prison capacity;23 ' and (6)
state frequently use intermediate sanctions as alternatives to
incarceration.23 2 The sentencing guidelines implemented in
Minnesota, Washington, Pennsylvania, and Oregon have been
considered among the most successful among the state models,
and for this reason serve as useful examples of the differences
between state and federal systems.
A. State guidelines and "real offense" sentencing
The federal guidelines are unique in that they are based on
"actual offense behavior" and "relevant conduct," as opposed to
the offense of conviction. This method of sentencing is a hybrid
between "real offense sentencing," which sentences on the basis
of all identifiable conduct (that the prosecutor can prove in
court) ,2"' and "charge offense sentencing," which overlooks that
225. See generally, Tonry, supra notes 31 and 183. See also, Frase, supra note
205 and infra note 227.
226. Kay A. Knapp and Denis J. Haupdly, State and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 679, 680 n.2 (1992).
227. Breyer, supra note 203. See also, Richard S. Frase, Sentencing
Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reformers, 6 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 124-125 (1993).
228. Id.
229. Tonry, supra note 31, at 175.
230. Id. at 173.
231. Id. at 171.
232. Frase, supra note 227, at 126.
233. The standard of proof for the sentencing hearing is by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Deborah Young, Factfinding at Federal
Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the Rules, 79 COaNELL L. REv. 299, 318-
322 (1994).
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conduct which does not constitute a statutory element of an
offense. The first element of real offense sentencing, "actual
offense behavior," requires a sentencer to consider alleged
crimes of which the offender was acquitted or never charged.
Thus, if a prosecutor charged a defendant with rape and kidnap-
ping, but the rape charge was later dropped, the fact that the
defendant was charged with rape would be a factor which the
sentencer must consider.
The other component of real offense sentencing, "relevant
conduct," is an extremely limited set of factors which may be con-
sidered by the judge when sentencing, and involve considera-
tions of things like the amount of drugs in the offense or the use
of a weapon - factors which often make up the elements of the
offense.2" 4 Real offense sentencing was specifically chosen by the
Commission to prevent prosecutors from conducting a mini pro-
portionality review - dismissing charges to offenses carried
overly harsh penalties, (given their assessment of the crime and
the offender), and instead charging offenses with a more "appro-
priate" sentence length. This goal has not been reached, how-
ever, insofar as prosecutors are able to "swallow the gun" and
choose not to present evidence to support the presence of aggra-
vating factors.235
The state guideline systems base sentences on the conviction
offense and the defendant's conviction record.236 Non-convic-
234. For example, for the offense of aggravated assault, if a firearm was
discharged, the base offense level is increased by five levels. U.S.S.G., supra
note 137, at § 2A2.2(b) (2) (A). In United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d. 414 (8th
Cir. 1992), the court held that it was not unconstitutional to consider relevant
conduct when sentencing. Relevant conduct is defined in the guidelines as:
(1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant;
and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal
plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in
concert with others, whether or not charges as a conspiracy), all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of
that offense.
U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at § 1B1.3(a) (2). Additionally, offenses committed as
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of
the conviction, all harm that resulted from the acts mentioned above, and all
harm that was the object of the acts or omissions is also "relevant conduct." Id.
at § 1B1.3(a) (2) (3) and (4).
235. Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 226, at 686.
236. Frase, supra note 227, at 124-125.
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tion offense characteristics do play some role, (i.e. weapon use,
regardless of whether or not it was an element of the offense),
but this role is significantly more narrow than with "real offense"
sentencing. In this way, the prosecutor has less motivation to
manipulate the facts and evidence of a case, as the charges
brought were those specifically selected by or agreed to by the
prosecutor. The prosecutor, in theory, brings the charge carry-
ing a penalty that comports with the severity and nature of the
offense committed.237 Thus, the prosecutor has less motivation
to "swallow the gun" and is able to present all the evidence for
the offense charged, while abiding by his or her ethical princi-
ples. State guidelines do not attempt to curb the discretion of
prosecutors, with the exception of Washington, which has cre-
ated voluntary, non-binding prosecutorial guidelines. 3 8
Federal guidelines also differ from state systems in that they
employ a "base case" approach. This system assigns a "base
offense level," which is the minimum point score for a given
offense. Additional points are then either added or subtracted to
take aggravating or mitigating factors into account. On the
other hand, state systems are based on the "usual case." The
state commissions consider each crime in the context of relevant
policy goals, the culpability of the offender, and the nature of the
offense. The commissions then arrive at a "usual" or typical case
for each crime by also considering such factors as offender char-
acteristics, situational factors, relationship between the victim
and the offender, victim characteristics, type of harm and level of
harm in the typical case.239 The state "usual case" rejects the
idea of a "base" or "minimum" score for a given offense, and
already incorporates many aggravating and mitigating factors
into the guideline range.
B. Factors considered when sentencing
Another important difference between the federal and state
guidelines lies in what may be considered relevant conduct by
the sentencer. The factors considered by the state when arriving
at the "usual case" are substantially more broad than those con-
sidered by the federal commission when arriving at its "heart-
land" cases.24° The result is that the "usual" case presents a much
237. In a perfect world, the crime that was actually committed would, if
charged, result in exactly the proper punishment in terms of mode and length,
in light of a proportionality review.
238. Frase, supra note 227, at 125.
239. Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 226, at 683.
240. Id. at 683-87.
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more complete picture of the offender and the offense, and the
individual judges have a great deal more flexibility in assessing
the offender's culpability. Mandatory minimums and other
determinate sentencing codes usually only include elements such
as use of a weapon, serious physical injury, aid by an accomplice,
or other similar factors. 4 ' The federal guidelines are not much
broader. State guidelines, on the other hand, tend to permit the
sentencer to consider more conceptual factors such as those
mentioned above.24 Not surprisingly, the federal commission
has expressly forbidden judges from considering most of the
more conceptual factors such as the effect of the sentence on the
defendant or his family, the offender's mental health or chemi-
cal dependence, and the age of the offender or the offender's
background, including any sexual or emotional abuse. In this
way, judges have no discretion to consider factors that "many
judges believe to be ethically relevant to sentencing." 24 3 It must
be said, to the Commission's credit, that many of the "forbidden"
factors were already considered by the commission when reach-
ing the guideline ranges or determined to be inappropriate for
consideration.
C. Tolerance of departures
There is also a greater tolerance for departures in the states
by the courts of appeals. In Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania
and Washington, departure rates are generally low.2'  This can
be partly explained by the fact that states are able to consider
many more factors which are "not ordinarily relevant" in the fed-
eral guidelines. Additionally, the state guidelines already con-
sider these factors in arriving at the appropriate guideline range.
The states vary in their tolerance for departures, but on the
whole, appellate courts are more hesitant to reverse trial court's
sentences. For example, in Pennsylvania, departures on substan-
tive grounds, (improper sentence), are rarely reversed, and the
guideline ranges tend to be very broad, thereby enabling
sentencers somewhat broad discretion when sentencing.2 45 In
Minnesota and Washington, however, guideline ranges are
noticeably more narrow. In those states, reversal on substantive
grounds is more common, though a sentencer's refusal to depart
241. Id.
242. Id. at 683.
243. Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps
Backward, 78JUDICATtURE 169, 171 (1995).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 175.
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is almost never reversed. 246 In State v. Kindem,247 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota stated that "[although] we do not intend to
entirely close the door.., it would be a rare case which would
warrant reversal of the refusal to depart."
The opportunity for and tolerance of departures in the fed-
eral system is much more limited, although guideline issues are
raised in about one half of all federal appeals. During 1994,
there were more than 8,000 appeals on guideline issues, where
before the guidelines, federal sentencing appeals were very
rare.2 4 Approximately 59.5% of all federal criminal appeals
involved the guidelines, and of those, 33.6% only involved guide-
line issues. 249 From 1989-1993, there has also been a marked
decrease in departures based on the judge's exercise of discre-
tion (from 12.2% to 7.5% of all cases), while departures based on
prosecutorial substantial assistance motions have increased from
5.8% to 17% of all cases. 25 ° This average differs greatly among
the circuits and districts, 251 but indicates that judicial discretion
in federal sentencing is limited further by reversals on appeal.
D. State commissions and statewide sentencing policy
Still another major difference between state and federal
guidelines is that the state sentencing commissions all serve as
the state's principal forum for sentencing policy proposals. The
result is that comprehensive, long term sentencing policy and
goals originate with one body, creating greater consistency
throughout the system and a more coherent body of law insofar
as it originates from one source - the state sentencing commis-
sion. The federal guidelines, though promulgated by the United
States Sentencing Commission, must meet with Congressional
approval. Because each member of Congress may have his or her
own agenda, consistency throughout the guidelines is impossible.
Additionally, when one crime becomes the target of "law and
246. Id.
247. 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
248. Steven L. Chanenson, Consistently Inconsistent: Circuit Rulings on the
Guidelines in 1994, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 224, 225 (1995) (citing a telephone
interview with the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
249. Id. However, departures are more frequently reversed on
procedural grounds, such as the failure to state reasons. Tonry, supra note 243,
at 175.
250. Marc Miller, Rehabilitating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78
JUDICATURE 180, 184 (1995).
251. Id. at 184-185.
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order sloganeering," Congress is usually quick to enact legisla-
tion carrying severe penalties to combat that offense.252
Though no commission is completely immune from the
influences of the legislature, the state sentencing commissions
are more insulated from their legislatures than their federal
counterpart.253 The state commissions are able to insulate sen-
tencing policy from the short term emotionalism that a particu-
lar crime may be generating at that point in time. Nevertheless,
in response to the tough on crime politics of the 1990s, Minne-
sota and Washington did make "public safety" the primary factor
in determining guideline ranges, and implemented harsher
sentences for those targeted offenses. 254 The difference then,
between the state and federal commissions, is that the states are
able to act as a short term buffer between the demand for har-
sher penalties and overall sentencing policy. "Political pressures
and emotions tend to support increased penalties for currently
topical crimes and to provide little support for comprehensive
unemotional approaches to crime control policies. Where the
political will exists to try to buffer sentencing policy from short-
term emotions, the experience in states shows that commissions
can provide that buffer - so long as the supportive political will
survives.255
E. Prison resources and sentencing policy
Another way in which state commissions promulgate overall
sentencing policy is by linking prison resources to that policy.
Minnesota, Washington and Oregon have all experienced very
252. Tonry, supra note 31, at 175.
253. There are a few ways in which this is accomplished. State
commissions often employ a broader range of individuals to make up the
commission. For example, Washington has a nineteen member commission;
the federal has seven full time members and two ex-officio members. Three
members are ex-officio: the secretary of corrections, chair of the parole board,
and the director of the Governor's budget office. Twelve other voting members
are appointed by the Governor. The initial commission was made up of four
superior court judges, two prosecuting attorneys, two defense attorneys, one
chief law enforcement officer, and three citizens. Four legislators were then
designated as non-voting members. Fallen, supra note 190, at 147. This broad
mix of individuals ensures that all those interested in sentencing (save for the
offender) has a voice in sentencing policy.
Nevertheless, Congress has also taken some steps to preserve the neutrality
of the commission. No more than four commissioners can be from any one
political party and the terms of the commissioners have been staggered so that
any one president, who nominates the commissioners, cannot fill the
commission with those favorable to his or her agenda.
254. Tonry, supra note 31, at 175.
255. Tonry, supra note 31, at 175-76.
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positive results when sentencing ranges and lengths were tied to
prison capacity.256 Even when a particular crime or class of
offenses became subject to the demand for harsher penalties, if
the sentence length for these offenses increased, there was a sim-
ilar decrease in length for other, less politically charged
offenses.257 Alternatively, if a perceived increase in needed
prison resources became imminent, these facilities could be con-
structed or prison resources expanded to meet those projected
needs. Minnesota and Washington confined their prison popula-
tion to available capacity and maintained lower than average
incarceration rate increases until legislative changes in the 1990s
lengthened sentencing ranges for many offenses.2"' In Oregon,
prison population controls continues to keep overcrowding
under control.259 Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Kansas and
Texas have all considered, and some have implemented, policies
of tying sentencing policy to correctional resources. 260 Despite
the fact that state commissions succumbed to political pressure
to increase those penalties, the state efforts illustrate sound com-
prehensive and long-term planning as an approach to policy
making.
Whether or not prison capacity should be tied to sentencing
decisions begs the question: if prisons are full and none are to be
built, should an egregious criminal be let go? This is, of course,
not what Minnesota, Oregon and Washington have done.
Instead, when capacity is reached, either more prisons are built
or some non-violent offenders, or some of those non-violent
offenders nearing the end of their sentences and suitable for
release, are let go. Ultimately, it is a political question how Con-
gress or the states should spend their tax dollars, but it is, at the
very least, irresponsible for Congress to increase sentence lengths
or mandatory minimum statutes without a thorough analysis of
the financial effects of the prison population. Too often, there is
simply no accountability with "tough on crime" politics. Unless
the budget is correspondingly increased with those tough on
256. Id. at 176.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 175; Frase, supra note 227, at 227. For example, while the
federal average in all districts was 17%, in the third circuit the average was 35%,
the Eastern district of PA was 51%, while the tenth circuit was 10%. Miller,
supra note 247, at 185.
259. Tonry, supra note 31, at 176.
260. Robin L. Lubitz, Recent History of Sentencing Reform in North Carolina, 6
FED. SENTENCING REP. 129 (1993); Kramer & Kempinen, supra note 191, at 155;
Gottlieb, supra note 160, at 158.
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crime measures, Congress will continue to make irresponsible
decisions.
F. Alternate sentences to incarceration
In addition to connecting prison resources to guideline
length, the states have instituted other methods of controlling
the prison population, which the federal guidelines have virtually
ignored. State guidelines often provide for sentences other than
incarceration. 261 Not only does this afford a sentencer the flexi-
bility to sentence an offender to a lighter sentence in an appro-
priate case, but it controls prison overcrowding by providing
meaningful alternatives to incarceration. Oregon has imple-
mented a system of punishment units.262 If 120 units is the pre-
sumptive sentence, the judge has discretion to impose any
sentence which constitutes 120 .units. 263  If 2 months imprison-
ment is equal to 120 units, and 1,000 hours community service is
also equivalent to 120 units, the judge would be free to consider
the nature of the offense and the offender, and any potential
future threat to society when sentencing.
One problem, however, with this approach is that it is very
difficult for commissions or sentencers to reach a conclusion
about exchange rates, i.e. what amount of community service is
really equal to X days in prison. Washington specifics equivalent
custodial and noncustodial penalties and authorizes judges to
impose them in the alternative.2 64 In this respect, Washington
has met with a problem similar to Oregon's when implementing
these noncustodial penalties, specifically the difficulty of formu-
lating a precise exchange rate.265 Moreover, because of the diffi-
culty in making "equivalent" punishments as subjectively
burdensome as incarceration, the use of these exchange rates is
limited to minor offenses and offenders. 266 Though states have
met with various hurdles in implementing these noncustodial
penalties, they go much farther than the federal guidelines in
261. For example, Wisconsin, in its objectives for its sentencing
guidelines, states that probation and non-incarcerative sentences are to be
preferred to imprisonment in an appropriate case. See Shane-DuBow, supra
note 193, at 163.
262. Tonry, supra note 31, at 181.
263. Id.
264. Tonry, supra note 240, at 182.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 183. It is impossible to say, for example, that any amount of
community service hours would be the equivalent of life imprisonment. It is
simply less burdensome than many of the lengthier terms of imprisonment.
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three respects: (1) they attempt to control prison populations;
67
(2) they recognize that certain minor offenses and offenders can-
not truly receive a proportionate punishment if it involves impris-
onment for any length of time; and (3) they recognize that viable
alternatives to incarceration exist and that attempts should be
made to explore those options.
Although the federal guidelines were created long after the
first state guidelines appeared, very little of the state systems and
methods entered into the final draft of the federal guidelines.
The merits of the decision not to base the federal guidelines on
the state models continue to dissipate as state guidelines and
commissions enjoy a stability and acceptance that the federal
guidelines have yet to experience. There is considerable internal
dissension within the United States Sentencing Commission, with
a great deal of political infighting and conflict.268 State commis-
sions, on the other hand, tend towards stability. The director of
the Pennsylvania commission was appointed in 1978 and
remained in that position until early 1993.269 Other state com-
missions have promoted their directors from within, and some
started as initial research directors when the guidelines were still
in their initiatory, unimplemented stage.270  Perhaps more
importantly, "[iln no state is there heated debate about the
guidelines' desirability and legitimacy and in no state is there
organized opposition to them."271 This experience is markedly
different than with the federal guidelines, and illustrates that the
differences that exist between the state and federal guidelines are
more than trivial or inconsequential. Those distinctions have
made the difference between guidelines that are respected and
followed by sentencers, and those that are highly criticized and
often circumvented.
Indeed a final lesson to be learned from the states is the
decrease in use of mandatory minimum statutes to combat
crime. As the state guidelines become more successful, the need
and the desirability of mandatory sentencing decreases. When a
workable and logical guideline system is in place, the harsh
sentences which are meted out by mandatory minimums are no
longer necessary. The guidelines will adequately reflect the seri-
267. Minnesota policy dictated that prison capacity not exceed 95%.
Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons
of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CoRNELL J. OF L. & PUB. POL. 279, 330
(Spring, 1993).
268. Tonry, supra note 31, at 177.
269. Id. at 177.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 175-176.
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ousness of the offense, and if not, the judge will have sufficient
discretion to depart. Though the federal guidelines have their
faults, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission could learn a great
deal from state efforts, critics have voiced approval for the fed-
eral guidelines given the alternative - mandatory minimums.
VII. THE "RELATIVE" SUCCESS OF THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES
Though sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums
share similar goals, the federal guidelines have been better able
to meet the objectives of Congress. The guidelines have suc-
ceeded in important ways: (1) they represent current notions of
what constitutes appropriate punishment; (2) they preserve a
limited power of discretion for judges; (3) they provide for
greater individualization of sentences; and (4) they avoid many
of the pitfalls of prosecutorial discretion.
Given the frequency with which penal policies and political
agendas change, mandatory minimums often have embodied
outdated concepts of punishment as well as the extreme
impulses of socity. By 1988, Congress had established
mandatory minimum penalties for most drug offenses. The sen-
tencing guidelines were not yet fully implemented, and as a
result, when these mandatory minimums were enacted they were
the only statutes which ensured that certain offenses received
certain penalties. Additionally, in the latter half of the 80s, crack
cocaine was a relatively new drug, thought to pose serious threats
to society, and therefore there was strong political and societal
pressure to enact severe penalties to deter possible offenders.
In recent years, the Sentencing Commission has criticized
these outdated, "get tough on crime" policies and has recently
suggested, in light of new information and studies on crack
cocaine, that ". . . the most efficient and effective way for Con-
gress to direct cocaine sentencing policy is through the estab-
lished process of sentencing guidelines, rather than relying solely
on a statutory distinction between the two forms of the same
drug." 72 In April of 1995, the Sentencing Commission recom-
mended that Congress reevaluate the penalty structures for
offenses involving crack cocaine, in an effort to harmonize the
mandatory statutes with the guidelines.273 The Commission,
272. 56 CRiM. L. REP. 2162 (1995).
273. The Crack/Cocaine Penalty Ratio: Recommendations to Congress, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 312 (1995). Currently, the statutes create a 100-1 quantity
ration between the two forms of cocaine - crack and powder. A defendant
receives a five year mandatory sentence for trafficking in 5 grams of crack or
500 grams of powder cocaine. Id.
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finding the ratio between the two forms both arbitrary and unjus-
tified, recommended that crack cocaine be treated the same way
as other forms of cocaine, i.e. 500 grams of either crack or pow-
der would result in five years mandatory imprisonment.274  On
November 1, 1995, Congress, for the first time since the Commis-
sion's inception, expressly rejected the Commission's proposal to
lower penalties for crack.275
Guidelines, as opposed to mandatory minimums, have been
designed by the Commission to avoid becoming outdated in two
ways. First, the amendment process affords the Commission the
opportunity to modify existing guidelines or to enact new guide-
lines when their intended purposes are no longer being
served.276 This element of flexibility is crucial to a system that
has as its goal evolution and refinement of the process. The
other way in which guidelines remain true to the system is the
process of research and analysis used to create the sentencing
grids. Congress alone defined the facets of mandatory mini-
mums, whereas the Commission employed the aid of judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys and probation officers to create
274. Proposed Cocaine Penalty Adjustment Act of 1995, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 312 (1995).
275. Cocaine Sentencing, Still Unjust, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1995 § 4, at 14.
Congress had until November 1, 1995 to reject the proposal or it would become
law. The proposal was rejected by both houses of Congress. Senator Orrin
Hatch gave a statement before the U.S. Senate in which he outlined the
reasoning behind the vote to reject the Commission's proposal. See Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, Statement of Senator Orrin Hatch before the United States
Senate (Nov. 2, 1995), At least one judge has felt the sting of his conscience
when forced to imposed lengthier sentences in crack cocaine cases. Judge is
Forced to Lengthen Sentences for Crack, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1995, at B5. Judge Lyle
Strom, an Eighth Circuit federal district court judge, was forced by the court of
appeals to lengthen sentences imposed under the guidelines by 10 years, based
solely on the fact that crack cocaine, as opposed to powder, was involved in the
offense. Id. Strom stated that he had delayed resentencing the defendants in
the hopes that Congress would adopt the Sentencing Commission's
recommendation to abolish the 500-1 distinction between crack and powder
cocaine. When sentencing, Strom apologized to the defendants, expressing his
regret that the guidelines did not provide him with sufficient discretion to
depart downwards. Id.
276. For another good example of mandatory minimums embodying
outdated notions of appropriate punishment, and how sentencing commissions
can provide a "buffer" see Parent, supra note 43, at 1786. An increase in the
price of silver in Minnesota in 1979 had resulted in a rise in burglaries and theft
of silver items. The public advocated harsh penalties for offenders, but the
commission resisted enacted these penalties. If those mandatory penalties had
been enacted, however, they would still be in the statutes, even though the
price of silver has since stabilized. Thus, the penalties would no longer reflect
the seriousness of the offense as measured by public perception.
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sentencing parameters.277  Federal judges, in particular,
appointed for life and immune to the pitfalls of answering to
their constituencies, have been better able to make tough or
unpopular choices without fear of election-dependent positions,
like those of Congress."7 Additionally, judges possess what a
majority of Congress does not - experience in sentencing. This
experience enables judges to draw on the cases that have come
before them to create appropriate sentencing policies. As the
Commission itself enjoys an objectivity and a range of experience
similar to the federal judiciary, the guidelines respond well to the
actual needs of the system.
In addition, the guidelines are superior to mandatory mini-
mums because they protect the interests of both the individual
and society by preserving a limited version ofjudicial discretion.
The Commission not only has developed relatively narrow ranges
within which a judge is to sentence an offender, but it has also
provided a limited opportunity for departure.2 79 The sentence
inevitably is more equitable and fair, protecting the fundamental
need of a criminal justice system to exact proportionate
punishments.
Furthermore, guideline sentencing reduces disparity where
mandatory minimums failed to. Instead of grouping defendants
under a broad umbrella, the guidelines define offenses with
greater specificity. 8 0 This creates an element of protection for
both the offender and the penal system. Additionally, should a
particular statute fail to consider every possible exception or
extenuating circumstance, the flexibility and malleability of the
sentencing guidelines will permit a reasoned departure from the
specified range, subject always to appellate review.
281
The guidelines achieve greater certainty insofar as the sen-
tence received does not depend heavily on the prosecutor's
charge.28 2 With mandatory minimums, the sentence length
depends solely on the charge pursued by the prosecutor. Since
some prosecutors view these statutes as overly harsh, offenders
were often charged with less serious crimes. Sentencing guide-
lines, on the other hand, apply a range to offenses, providing
room for departure should the sentence still be too severe. The
certainty of the guidelines, then, lies in the application of this
277. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
278. Freed, supra note 43, at 1698.
279. Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines," 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 129, 131 (1991).
280. Weigel, supra note 164, at 89-90.
281. Breyer, supra note 203, at 5-6.
282. Tonry, supra note 279, at 130.
442 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
definite range, as opposed to a specific sentence length. The
end result is a sentence closely grounded in the defendant's
actual conduct as opposed to the offense charged.
Proponents of the sentencing guidelines would argue that
the success of the guidelines should not be qualified by the term
"relative." The primary advocate of the sentencing guidelines is,
not surprisingly, the Sentencing Commission, which in its report
to the Congress on mandatory minimums, praised the success of
the guidelines and their superiority to mandatory minimums.
2 83
The Commission reported that the guidelines are more likely to
achieve the goals most commonly cited in support of mandatory
minimums and do so without bringing unwanted disparity and
uncertainty to the system. 84
A substantial body of case law also surrounds the sentencing
guidelines, most notably United States v. Mistretta.285 In this case,
the. Supreme Court held that the sentencing guidelines were a
valid and constitutional delegation of legislative power to the
Sentencing Commission. The Court held that Congress had pro-
vided the Commission with a sufficiently specific and detailed
process for promulgating the guidelines, and that there was no
separation of powers violation because the whole power of one
department was not exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another department.286 Far from endorsing
the Guidelines, the Mistretta Court was asked only to rule on their
Constitutional validity.
Lower Federal courts have sometimes been more supportive
of the sentencing guidelines. In United States v. Rivera,28 7 for
example, the court discussed the scope of the guidelines, and the
appropriateness of the discretion reserved for judges under the
guidelines. The court stated that:
Ultimately . . . the Guidelines cannot dictate how courts
should sentence in ... special, unusual, or other-than-ordi-
nary circumstances. And that is how it should be .... the
very theory of the Guidelines system is that when courts,
drawing upon experience and informed judgment in such
cases, decided to depart, they will explain their departures.
The courts of appeals, and the Sentencing Commission,
283. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, at 27-35.
284. Id. at 14-16. These six goals are (1) to exact retribution/just deserts;
(2) to deter and to promote certainty, (3) to incapacitate serious offenders; (4)
to reduce disparity, (5) to induce co-operation from offenders; and (6) to
induce guilty pleas.
285. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
286. Id. at 374, 381.
287. 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1993).
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will examine, and learn from those reasons. And, the
resulting knowledge will help the Commission to change,
to refine, and to improve the Guidelines themselves. That
is the theory of partnership that the Guidelines embody.
288
Though the guidelines often come under attack for violating the
constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment,
or as a breach of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clause,
guidelines have just as frequently withstood these challenges.289
VIII. DEPARTURES AND APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER
THE GUIDELINES
According to the guidelines, there are essentially four situa-
tions in which an appeal may properly be brought: (1) if the sen-
tence was imposed in violation of a law;29 ° (2) if the sentence was
based on an incorrect application of the guidelines;29 1 (3) if the
sentence was plainly unreasonable; and (4) if the sentencer
authorized an upward departure, 292 or if the sentencer author-
ized a downward departure.13 If a departure has been made,
the sentencer must state his or her reasons for that departure,
and generally, that departure will be upheld if it was "reason-
able."29 4 Both upward and downward departures fall into one of
two categories: (1) guided or motion-dependent departures (for
substantial assistance) or (2) spontaneous departures pursuant to
§ 5K2 (for aggravating or mitigating factors not adequately con-
sidered by the Commission when creating the guidelines)."
Certain restrictions apply both on the judge's ability to
depart, and a parties' ability to bring an appeal. A discretionary
decision not to depart is never appealable. Once a departure has
been granted, however, a defendant cannot appeal a favorable
departure. For example, a defendant who has received a down-
ward departure cannot ask the sentencer for a reduction greater
than that which he has received. Moreover, a judge may not
288. Id. at 949-950.
289. See supra notes 76-141 for Solem, Rummel, Harmelin and Stephens. See
also United States v. Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (Utah 1990) (in which the
defendants challenged the sentencing guidelines as violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution).
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(1)&(2) (Supp. 1994).
291. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)or(4) (Supp. 1994).
292. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (3) (Supp. 1994) (upward departures are appeal-
able by the defendant).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (3) (Supp. 1994) (downward departures are
appealable by the government).
294. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
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depart both upwards and downwards and net the result. A
departure can only go one way.
When reviewing a departure, appellate courts focus on the
reasonableness of the departure, whether the basis for the depar-
ture was a factor that was not adequately considered by the Com-
mission, and whether a departure for that reason should result,
given the facts of a case. The First Circuit has developed a tripar-
tite test for reviewing departures, taken from United States v. Diaz-
ViIlafane.29 Under this test, the court's inquiry is (1) whether
the circumstances in the instant case are sufficiently unusual to
warrant a departure (i.e. of a kind or to a degree); (2) whether
the circumstances, if a proper basis for departure, actually exist
in the case; and (3) whether the direction and degree of the
departure were reasonable. In general, the circuits employ some
variation of this test - some making it more restrictive and some
more broad.297
In practice, finding a circumstance that the Commission has
completely failed to consider, either in kind or degree, has
proven to be a difficult hurdle to overcome. There exists a sub-
stantial body of commentary and policy statements issued by the
Commission in which almost every conceivable aggravating or
mitigating circumstance has at least been discussed. In addition,
the Commission has expressly forbidden the consideration of
certain factors such as chemical use, race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, socio-economic status, community ties, age, and
familial responsibilities. 298 And among the grounds listed as
proper circumstances to consider, none involve the personal
characteristics or circumstances of the defendant, which severely
restricts both the discretion of the sentencer and the review
undertaken by the appellate courts. It also places the focus of
the departure inquiry on the offense, as opposed to the offender,
as most of the grounds for departure which are condoned by the
Commission involve facts related to the offense and its commis-
sion. Thus, though the Commission states that the guidelines
296. 874 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1989).
297. Id. at 49. E.g., the Fourth Circuit adds an abuse of discretion
standard to the analysis. Selya & Kipp, supra note 205, at 20. The Ninth Circuit
previously employed a five step test, which required a de novo inquiry by the
court as to whether the district court adequately identified the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances in the case. Id. at 21. This five step test was later
rejected in United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
which reduced the analysis to three steps similar to those articulated in Diaz-
Villafane. Id.
298. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at § 5H1.1- 5H1.12.
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permit opportunity for departure and review, in reality this
opportunity is quite restricted.
Though generally more prone to uphold departures upon
appellate review, the states fall within a broad spectrum of view-
points regarding departures. Most state courts of appeals are
more tolerant of departures; however differences do exist- among
the circuits, and some substantially limit the ability of a district
court to depart.
In the First Circuit, between 1987 and 1992, appellate courts
reversed downward departures in nine cases and affirmed
none.299 The court, however, in United States v. Rivera, 00 held
that appellate courts should review a district court's determina-
tion of unusualness with full awareness of and respect for the
trier's superior feel for the case.5 0' Then-Chief-Judge Stephen
Breyer's analysis of the case suggested that district courts had
greater discretion to depart, but Rivera's deference to district
courts was limited to cases where a defendant's, (1) personal
characteristics, (2) life circumstances, or (3) criminal conduct
were never considered by the U.S. Sentencing Commission when
creating the guidelines.3 0 2 As it is very difficult to find such unu-
sual circumstances, Rivera has not led to more departures, but
rather a stricter reading of the guidelines. Additionally, there
are several other cases which limit both downward and upward
departures, indicating that in the First Circuit, the opportunity to
depart is quite restricted.
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, is typically deferen-
tial on appeal. The court has upheld the guideline policy of
using acquitted conduct to increase the guideline range, though
some judges have voiced disapproval of this requirementf
s'
Deciding another important issue, the court in United States v.
Gigante,30° overturned a conviction which based a substantial sen-
299. Michael J. Malinowski, The First Circuit: District Courts May Decide What
is "Unusual" But Will They Take the Hint?, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 279, 281
(1994).
300. 994 F.2d 942, 952 (1st Cir. 1993).
301. Id. at 950 (quoting United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 50
(1989)).
302. Breyer's comments in the case seem to suggest that the district
courts have a measurable degree of autonomy when deciding whether or not to
depart, but he then limits that discretion to cases where "the question on review
is simply whether or not the allegedly special circumstances are of the 'kind'
that the Guidelines, in principle permit the sentencing court to consider at all."
Id. at 950-51. This is a significant restriction on the ability of a district court to
depart.
303. United States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1994).
304. 39 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1994).
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tencing enhancement for relevant conduct on a preponderance
of the evidence. The court held that the correct standard of
proof was applied, but that there was a constitutional require-
ment of ". . . rough proportionality between the weight of the
evidence of the uncharged conduct and the degree of adjust-
ment or departure."3" 5 The Second Circuit, though for the most
part deferential to the trial court, has also limited relevant con-
duct to acts that were part of the ". . same course of common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."306 This implies that
some connection, and more than just a tenuous one, must exist
between the conduct and the offense of conviction in order for
that conduct to form the basis of a departure. Overall, however,
reversals based on a mis-assessment of relevant conduct are rare.
The Third Circuit strictly limits downward departures but
recent decisions have created new rules permitting discretionary
departures in selected cases. The appellate courts engage in a
very fact specific review of downward departures, and the ques-
tion on appeal has become whether the facts of a case merit
departure, and whether a district court chose the correct rule
under which to depart.30 7 Noteworthy, however, is the decision
in United States v. Shoupe,3 °8 in which the court allowed a down-
ward departure in the base offense level where the career
offender (or three-strikes) provision overrepresented the serious-
ness of the defendant's criminal history.
3 0
The Fourth Circuit tends to permit departures on grounds
that are specifically identified by Congress, but it is unlikely to
affirm a departure on grounds that a factor was not adequately
considered by the Sentencing Commission. 10 The Fifth Circuit
takes a very permissive view of departures and allows a district
court to consider a wide variety of information when departing.
In United States v. Ashburn, 1 ' the court held that the district court
had adequately justified its departure, even though it did not spe-
305. Id. at 47.
306. See Andrew H. Shapiro, Guideline Development in the Second Circuit: A
Willingness to Make Law, 7 FED. SENTENCING REP. 230 (1995) (discussing United
States v. Fermin, 32 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1994) and United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23
F.3d 738, (2d Cir. 1994)).
307. Quincy M. Crawford, The Third Circuit: Rules Versus Discretion, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 234 (1995).
308. 35 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 1994).
309. Id. at 840. The dissent pointed out that the language of § 4A1.3 only
discussed departures in the criminal history categories and not the base offense
level.
310. Mary M. French, The Forth Circuit: Adding to Inter-Circuit Conflicts, 7
FED. SENTENCING REP. 237 (1995).
311. 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994).
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cifically state reasons for each increase in criminal history cate-
gory. The general statement of departure was held sufficient to
allow the court to increase Ashburn's criminal history category
several levels.
The Seventh Circuit held that when the government moves
for a downward departure based on substantial assistance, judges
could depart below the mandatory minimum sentences.3 1 2 This
was consistent with the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits.31 3 In
another important case, the court upheld a downward departure
where the defendant's family ties and responsibilities or commu-
nity ties ". . are so unusual that they may be characterized as
extraordinary."314 Though these factors are "not ordinarily rele-
vant" according to the sentencing Commission, this case provides
defendants with room to secure a downward departure in unu-
sual cases.
The Eighth Circuit has held in United States v. Hammer,"a5
that if the defendant challenges any facts in the presentence
report, the sentencing court must provide the defendant with an
evidentiary hearing, or specifically state that the court is not rely-
ing on such facts in sentencing. 16 The Ninth Circuit court of
appeals reversed the downward departures in United States v.
Koon,317 which involved the officers who were charged with beat-
ing Rodney King. Taking a rigid and mechanistic approach to
the guidelines, the court upheld the validity of combining factors
to arrive at a mitigating circumstance, but also held that the
court could not consider (alone or in combination) factors that
should not be part of the consideration according to the guide-
lines.3 ' The court of appeals therefore ordered a new sentenc-
ing hearing for the officers.3" 9 Upon review by the Supreme
312. United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir. 1994).
313. Id. See also Matthew C. Crowl and Barry Rand Elder, The Seventh
Circuit: Innovative Interpretations Enhance the Discretion of the District Court, 7 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 246, 249 (1995).
314. United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 906 (7th Cir. 1994).
315. 3 F.3d 266 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1121 (1994).
316. Id. at 272-3.
317. 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1993).
318. Id. at 1452. The dissenting opinion for the court of appeals stated
that "The principle underlying our combination departure cases is rooted in
the common sense maxim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."
The dissent, in rejecting the majority's method of examining each factor
individually, went on to say that "[n ] o combination departure could survive this
divide and conquer method of review." United States v. Koon, 45 F.2d 1301,
1305 (1995).
319. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1462. The Supreme Court has recently agreed to
hear this issue and will decide whether the court of appeals correctly applied
the guidelines in overturning the downward departures. See Linda Greenhouse,
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Court, this case may prove to be still another important restric-
tion on the ability of a trial court to depart and for an offender to
bring an appeal. 20
The ability of a district court to depart differs greatly among
the circuits, as does the deference granted to district courts by
the various courts of appeals. The differences among the circuits
highlight the fact that many judges are uncertain as to the extent
of their authority to depart and are concerned about overstep-
ping those carefully drawn bounds. As more and more cases are
brought before the Supreme Court on departure related issues,
many of these issues will be decided for the lower courts. Until
then, the circuits will continue to interpret and apply the guide-
lines, and test the limits of the discretion which the guidelines
has preserved. Historically, the federal courts have been much
less willing to do so than the state systems, but this may change as
judges become more aware of their role under the guidelines.
IX. WEAKNESSES OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Although the guidelines have been more successful than
mandatory minimums in realizing the goals of sentencing
reform, ample room for improvement exists. The criticisms of
the guidelines center around five points of contention: (1) the
guidelines are confusing and complex; (2) they are too mechani-
cal; (3) they are time-consuming to apply; (4) they do not permit
sufficient individualization; and (5) they, like mandatory mini-
mums, shift discretion to the prosecutor.
Guideline sentencing has been attacked by critics as too
complex and confusing to apply.3 21 The sentencing grid con-
tains 258 boxes - 43 rows of "Offense Levels" and 6 columns of
"Criminal History Categories," with further adjustments for vari-
ous offense and offender characteristics. This complexity all but
invites errors in calculation.3 22 Additionally, since the guidelines
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case on Government's Refusal to Adjust 1990 Census,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at A18. The officers also raised a double jeopardy
challenge to their subsequent federal prosecution, but the Court refused to
hear that issue.
320. The deadline for briefs to be filed in the Supreme Court was
November 9, 1995. The case is scheduled for argument in January. See Koon v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995) (granting certiorari and scheduling briefs).
321. See generally, Marc Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25
U.C. DAVIs L. Rxv. 587 (1992).
322. Id. at 587. The Commission expressly rejected a broad-category
approach used by some states because "relatively few, simple categories and
narrow imprisonment ranges" are "ill suited to the breadth and diversity of
federal crimes."
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establish ranges of punishment without stating a midpoint, and
because the grid contains so many boxes, comparisons between
sentences and policy choices for various offenses become diffi-
cult, if not impossible, unless all the factors taken into considera-
tion in the sentence are made known."' 3 This difficulty is
compounded by the fact that many ranges. overlap, a result
desired by the Sentencing Commission. 24
Consider an offender who is convicted of fraud to obtain
goods in the amount of $200,000 and who has no criminal his-
tory. Additionally, no weapons or victims were involved. Under
the guidelines, fraud has a base offense level of 6, with an
increase of 8 points for the amount taken; therefore the offense
level for this offender is 14. This offense level would give the
sentencer a range of 15-21 months in which to punish. 25
Now consider a second offender, convicted of fraud in the
amount of $5000, with one prior conviction. Presume also that
the offense involved a substantial risk of bodily harm. The base
offense level is still 6, with an increase to level 13 because of the
risk of harm. Given the prior conviction, the applicable sentenc-
ing range is 15-21 months.
Essentially, the crime and the requisite intent are substan-
tially similar in each situation, but it is arguable that because the
second offender had a conscious or reckless disregard for the
safety of others and a prior conviction, that offender is more cul-
pable. Even though the first offender took a substantially larger
amount of money, he or she is less morally culpable, as a higher
premium is generally (and appropriately) placed on human life.
Regardless, both offenders are eligible for the same sentencing
range. Adequate judicial discretion may have prevented this fail-
ure to individualize sentences based on relevant circumstances of
both the offender and the offense.
The federal sentencing guidelines were originally designed
to structure a process riddled with disparity and uncertainty, but
without going as far as mandatory sentencing in removing all
elements of discretion and flexibility. The complexity of a grid
system, however, focuses the attention of the sentencer not upon
any policy involved or the offender's need for punishment but
upon mechanical calculations. Any system that attempts to
reduce sentencing to a rote application of rules and calculations
323. Id. at 604-605.
324. Id. at 600-603. It was thought that the overlaps in ranges would
eliminate the possibility for appeals by limiting the importance of disputed
sentencing factors. See also U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6.
325. Miller, supra note 321, at 611 (referring to a reprinted copy of the
Federal Sentencing Guideline grid).
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risks doling out punishments the way a computer would -
mechanically and without individualization. Crimes do not fol-
low rules that lend themselves to easy categorization. When the
balance is not struck exactly, predictability and ease of applica-
tion can be substituted for culpability and proportionality. As
Judge Weinstein said, "It]here are occasions where the law's
implacability must bend and give homage through compassion
to humanity's frailties and nature's cruelties.""2 6
A good example of the need for sentence individualization
is taken from United States v. Rodriquez. 27 Defendant "A" had 15
years of diligent employment at a bank and was generally known
as honest and trustworthy, yet when her husband died, her finan-
cial security was threatened. One of her four children became
very ill, so to buy the medicine needed for her child, she embez-
zled $10,000 from the bank. The child died anyway, so she con-
fessed her crime and returned the unused portion of the money
to the bank. Had she not done this, she would not have been
caught.
Defendant "B", on the other hand, has cheated and
deceived others throughout his life. He left his first wife and
children after spending all of his wife's money, remarried biga-
mously without revealing the fact that he was already married,
and obtained ajob at the bank using forged references. He then
embezzled money and was caught. Under the guidelines, these
two defendants would be subject to the same sentencing range,
unless the judge decided to use his or her departure powers.
The court in the Rodriguez case argued that "[d]istinguishing
between A and B is not the 'unwarranted sentencing disparity'
the Act sought to terminate ... [A] substantial distinction is fully
warranted and required if the system is to do justice. "328 Unfor-
tunately, judges are not always willing to use their powers to
depart as they are unsure of the scope of that power, and appel-
late courts are often very critical of those departures that are
appealed to them. 2 9
326. United States v. Perez, 756 F.Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
327. 724 F.Supp. 1118, 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
328. Id. at 1122.
329. See, e.g., Susan E. Ellingstad, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward
Departures Based on a Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76
MINN. L. REv. 957, 977 (1992) (discussing the misperceptions of courts as to
their authority to depart). See also Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: Empirical and Case
Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L. J. 393, 424, 431, 433-434 (1991) (discussing the
differences in the circuits surrounding their perceived authority to depart and
the differences in the appellate courts regarding their tolerance for those
departures).
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In addition to criticizing the guidelines for not drawing suffi-
cient distinctions between defendants, many judges and com-
mentators have said that the guidelines are too time-consuming
to apply."' 0 Although this is due in part to the requisite mathe-
matical calculations, the amount of time needed to sentence is
enhanced by factual disputes relating to the offense or the
offender."' 1 The judge provides a pre-sentence report to both
the prosecution and the defendant, and both may file objections.
A conference between all involved then must be held to resolve
the issues, with the government and defendant having to file
final sentencing statements with the court. If an agreement as to
the facts still cannot be reached, an evidentiary hearing becomes
necessary. 33 2 Witnesses and experts are questioned and evidence
produced, all of which drain the scarce resources of the court.
A further weakness rests in the Commission's allowance for
"relevant" characteristics to be considered. Characteristics that
judges and prosecutors had been using actively in the past to dis-
tinguish cases have been specifically prohibited.33 Age, family
relationships, work commitments, education, mental and emo-
tional conditions, and drug or alcohol abuse have been labeled
"not ordinarily relevant" and may justify a departure only if they
are extraordinary in the context of the case.3 4 Factors which do
not meet that high standard, yet have great bearing on the case,
then become lost in the mathematical shuffle of the sentencing
grid. Additionally, the vagueness of the term "extraordinary"
subjects the process to the differing methodologies of individual
judges. When a judge refuses to sentence under the guidelines
because of an appeal to her sense of equity and fairness, this
resistance calls into question the very ability of the guidelines to
meet the needs of the penal system.
A final weakness in the Sentencing Guidelines is a shifting of
discretion to the parties. If an indictment contains multiple
counts, control over the applicable sentencing range rests in the
330. Miller, supra note 321 (discussing the complexity of the federal
sentencing grid, some of the justifications offered for that complexity, and
comparing the federal grid to the simpler state models). See also, Weigel, supra
note 164, at 99; Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's First Impression of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 25 ALB. L. Rv. 1 (1987); U.S. Sentencing Commission,
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE.
GUIDELINES SysTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE
OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 108
(1991).
331. Weigel, supra note 164, at 91-92.
332. Id.
333. Miller, supra note 321, at 608.
334. Id.
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hands of the parties, who may agree as to what charge or charges
the defendant will plead guilty."3 5 To their credit, both Congress
and the Commission recognized this difficulty and concluded
that "the court may accept a charge agreement if it determines
... that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness
of the actual offense behavior and that accepting the agreement
will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing.. ."336
Though the guidelines shift a great deal of discretion to the pros-
ecutor, the ability of the court to accept or reject a charge agree-
ment still preserves an element of discretion for judges.
In an effort to avoid some of the adverse effects of plea bar-
gaining and to bring some structure to the process, then-Attor-
ney General Richard Thornburgh issued an executive order in
March of 1989, stating that plea bargaining must not undermine
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.337 Thornburgh's memo con-
tained several principles that prosecutors should follow when
considering a plea bargain. He stated that charges should not be
dropped or bargained away unless the prosecutor had a "... good
faith doubt as to the government's ability readily to prove a
charge for legal or evidentiary reasons."33 s More importantly, he
wrote that charges should reflect the seriousness of the defend-
ant's conduct, and that most plea agreements should be in writ-
ing or at least stated on the record.3 9 This guidance provides
335. Weigel, supra note 164, at 93.
336. U.S.S.G., supra note 137, at § 6B1.2(a) & commentary.
337. See Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Memorandum to
Federal Prosecutors: Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act, Mar.
13, 1989, reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 347 (1994) [hereinafter
Thornburgh].
338. An overloaded docket was the only exception to this requirement.
Thornburgh, supra note 328, at 348. Thornburgh's memorandum to
prosecutors is not the only effort to structure prosecutorial discretion under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In 1987 when the guidelines took effect, the
U.S. Department of Justice issued a manual for prosecutors. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing Guidelines and Other Provisions
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Nov. 1, 1987). In 1992, then acting
Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger issued a memorandum to
prosecutors in an effort to clarify the Thornburgh memo. Acting Deputy
Attorney General George J. Terwilliger, III, Memorandum to Federal
Prosecutors: Indictment and Plea Procedures Under Guideline Sentencing,
Feb. 7, 1992, reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 350 (1994). Additionally,
Attorney General Janet Reno has also issued a "clarification" memo. See
Attorney General Janet Reno, Memo to Holders of the United States Attorney's
Manual, Title 9: Principles of Federal Prosecution, Oct. 12, 1993, reprinted in 6
FED. SENTENCING REP. 352 (1994).
339. Thornburgh wrote: "[Ilt would be improper for a prosecutor to
agree that a departure is in order, but to conceal the agreement in a charge
bargain that is presented to a court as a fait accompli so that there is neither a
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prosecutors with very limited discretion in deciding which pleas
to accept, and helps eliminate some of the adverse effects of
unfettered prosecutorial discretion. Thornburgh's order does
not always require the prosecutor to charge the maximum
offense, and in this way, preserves the discretion crucial to enable
the prosecution to perform its duties.
340
Although judges still have some discretion when deciding
whether or not to accept a plea bargain,"' this practice subjects
the defendant to the risks of appellate review. If a defendant
pleads guilty to a certain charge, which is only one of many which
could be brought, or is a charge carrying a lesser penalty than
others for which he could be convicted, that lesser charge or sen-
tence is put at risk if the defendant or the prosecution appeals
that sentence. The judge could chose to depart from the guide-
line range, even in the case of a plea bargain, and must therefore
state the reasons for this departure. If an offender brings an
appeal342 and this appeal fails, the appellate court could find the
lower court's departure was unjustified, and the defendant may
receive a higher sentence when his case is remanded for sentenc-
ing. 4 ' A defendant, therefore, may prefer to plead not guilty
and risk a trial than to lock himself into a guilty plea that may
later subject him to a lengthier sentence. Additionally, a judge
must limit plea benefits to a two-level adjustment to the offense
level, or approximately a 20% sentence reduction,"'W another dis-
incentive to pleading guilty.
record of nor judicial review of the departure." Thornburgh, supra note 337, at
347.
340. The ability to make "deals" with offenders in return for assistance, as
well as the ability of prosecutors to forego criminal prosecution for other
strategic reasons is essential to the efficient and necessary operation of the
criminal justice system. For example, some prosecutors often hold off on
prosecuting one individual for a less serious offense in the hopes that a more
serious offense will be supported by additional evidence. Other attempts have
been made to curtail prosecutorial discretion. In Washington, for example, the
State Sentencing Commision attempted to create a set of voluntary
prosecutorial guidelines. Not surprisingly, these guidelines met with many of
the same problems as the initial state guidelines - they are completely advisory
and noncompliance does not constitute a basis for appeal. See Fallen, supra
note 190, at 148-149.
341. Under the guidelines, judges may not accept pleas which do not
adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense. U.S.S.G, supra note 137, at
§ 6B1.2(a).
342. See supra notes 290-295 (listing proper grounds for the appeal of a
sentence).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (Supp. 1994). See also, Weigel, supra note 164, at
96-97.
344. Id. See also, Dolinko, supra note 8, at 93.
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Several studies have been conducted, comparing the
number of guilty pleas entered both before and after the guide-
lines were implemented. 45 One such study used data collected
by the Federal Probation Sentencing and Supervision Informa-
tion System ("FPSSIS"), and reported that under the pre-guide-
line system approximately 85% of federal defendants in the fifth
circuit entered guilty pleas.34 Since the guidelines, this rate has
decreased to 66.12%. In a comparison of the number of pre-
and post-guideline guilty pleas for thirteen different offenses, the
number of guilty pleas decreased for every offense save for three,
two of which saw only minimal increases." 7 This decrease in the
number of guilty pleas translates directly into an increased case
load for trial courts and a further drain on the resources of the
criminal justice system4
X. MANDATORY MINIMUMS, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
To understand why mandatory minimums have failed to
achieve proportionate and uniform sentences, and why the
guidelines have met with only limited success, it is necessary to
discuss exactly why the goal of proportionate sentencing is so dif-
ficult, yet so necessary, to attain. The "proportionality principle"
provides that punishment should comport with the degree of
harm caused and the culpability of the offender.3 49 To use an
example from Judge Powell's dissenting opinion in Rummel v.
Estelle, if New York City were to enact a law requiring a life sen-
tence on third-offense illegal parking to deter this conduct, the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment would clearly be
345. Katie & Sager, supra note 329, at 393.
346. Id. at 403.
347. A "minimal increase" is defined as less than 1% change. Id. at 405.
348. Of course, guilty pleas in and of themselves, do not necessarily
indicate that some greater good has resulted. It certainly would not mean, in
every case, that justice has been done or that an offender has received a
proportionate sentence. In fact, a drop in the number of guilty pleas may have
very positive implications. If, instead of pleading guilty, each offender goes to
trial, is given a fair trial, convicted of the proper offense given the crime
committed, and is sentenced according to the guidelines, it could very well be
that the most just and proportionate result has been achieved.
349. Heald, supra note 137, at 455. The "proportionality principle"
dictates that a punishment should not be "cruel and unusual" in relation to the
offense committed. Many offenders have asserted that the Eighth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution contains a proportionality requirement in that if a
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment is violated. See supra notes 76-141 and
accompanying text (discussing Rummen4 Hutto, Solem, and Harmelin in the
context of a proportionality requirement under the Eighth Amendment).
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violated."' 0 This is because the harm caused would be grossly
disproportionate to the punishment imposed. The proportional-
ity principle serves as a limitation on the power of legislators to
define crimes and fix sentences without including moral and
constitutional principles.
While theoretically the principle of proportionality is very
sound, difficulties arise in its implementation. Primarily, it is
impossible to set forth objective criteria for making punishments
fit crimes perfectly.351 The majority in Rummel refused to require
proportionality reviews for sentences other than capital punish-
ment or, in extreme cases, life sentences."' 2 One of the reasons
for this decision is that the Court recognized that it was much
easier to determine the proportionality of a sentence of capital
punishment for a particular offender than it was to draw that line
between different sentences of imprisonment.353  The Court
expressed concern that the individual, subjective notions of the
judges would inevitably enter the analysis, rendering an objective
determination of proportionality almost impossible. 3 4
The Court in Solem v. Helm attempted to reduce the propor-
tionality principle into objective standards.3 55 The Court estab-
lished a tripartite test requiring a sentencer to (1) assess the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment; (2)
compare the challenged sentence to sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) compare the chal-
lenged sentence to those imposed for the same offense in other
350. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
"In this respect, proportionate sentencing insures that a defendant is treated as
an individual and thus limits the pursuit of utilitarian goals by legislatures. This
is in accord with the Eighth Amendment's concern with the dignity of the
individual." See Heald, supra note 137, at 456.
See also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 230-237 (1968) (in
which Hart discusses the necessity of connecting the severity of punishment
with the gravity of the offense; "Murder is to be punished more severely than
theft; intentional killing more severely than unintentionally causing death
through carelessness." The problem with ending the analysis here, however, is
that saying that murder is to be punished more severely than theft is the easy
part of proportionality. The real issue is what the proper term of imprisonment
(or other punishment) for murder, or for theft should be. That murder is a
greater offense than theft does not lead to the equation linking crime and
punishment which is necessary to determine a proper punishment. Hart also
leaves this important question unanswered).
351. See supra Section I, discussing the impossibility of this kind of
equation.
352. Heald, supra note 137, at 457.
353. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980).
354. Id.
355. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983).
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jurisdictions."5 6 Critics of this approach contend that these crite-
ria still afford judges too much subjective discretion and under-
mine the constitutionally mandated powers of the legislature,
giving rise to separation of powers concerns.3 57 Permitting
courts to legislate through their sentences, on a piecemeal basis,
and use subjective notions of proportionality, would thwart the
purpose of a separation of powers between the legislative and
judicial branches.35 The courts would become legislators inso-
far as they would essentially be defining and interpreting a non-
existent requirement of proportionality, which is not codified in
any statute. Additionally, piecemeal legislation by courts would
create uncertainty in the application of the relevant law, as a
defendant could not accurately gauge what a court might do
when faced with certain circumstances.
Though attempts at relative proportionality have been
made, strict proportionality is an impossible goal, given the diffi-
culties in equating incomparable factors such as, for example,
theft and time served. "Requiring strict proportionality would
presume that precise correlations between criminal offenses and
deserved punishments were discernible and acknowledged by
policymakers throughout the nation."359 A requirement of strict
proportionality raises three issues: (1) local problems may call
for penal policies that differ from those of the nation as a whole;
(2) varying perceptions of the gravity of a given offense further
contribute to a lack of uniformity and proportionality through-
out all the jurisdictions; and (3) strict proportionality is con-
ceptually impossible in every case. Strict proportionality
requirements would not permit a city such as Washington, D.C.
to enforce harsher penalties for crimes that are particularly ram-
pant in that community, when a city in the midwest does not face
that kind of crime on a regular basis, and is therefore less con-
cerned with severe penalties for its commission. Some offenses
appear graver in one jurisdiction because of the frequency with
which they are committed. It is therefore natural for citizens and
politicians in that community to respond more severely to those
offenders. For this reason, it would be impossible, and not only
undesirable, to require strict proportionality among the
jurisdictions.
To deal with these problems, courts have held that a range
of sentences for a given offense would comport with constitu-
356. Id. at 290-91.
357. Heald, supra note 137, at 457.
358. Id.
359. Id. at n.5.
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tional requirements as long as the sentences were not grossly dis-
proportionate. 60 These interpretations by various courts imply
that uniformity in the sense of precise sentence correlation's
between or within jurisdictions is not the end to be achieved. On
the contrary, serious concerns about the sovereignty of the state
over its penal laws would arise if Congress or the federal courts
required nationwide uniformity of sentences.3 6 ' Instead, consis-
tency among the several jurisdictions must involve a range of per-
missible sentences which accounts for local responses to crime,
which may not match those on the federal level. 62
Mandatory minimums attempt to achieve uniformity without
adequately considering exactly what type of uniformity is desira-
ble - broad uniformity, uniformity for like offenses, like offend-
ers, or within each jurisdiction. If broad uniformity is the goal,
mandatory minimums are destined for failure, as evidenced by
the sentencers who have openly dissented from applying
mechanical and harsh rules of sentencing.3 6 And though the
guidelines permit some room for subjective determinations of
proportionality, they fail too, as judges and prosecutors have
admitted manipulating the guidelines to find an opportunity to
exercise almost unfettered discretion." 4 Reducing disparity does
not necessarily result in proportionality unless defendants are so
carefully grouped together as to account for subtle differences in
both the offense and the offender.
Sentencers have understood this distinction, however, and
are in the unfortunate position of having to adhere to the guide-
lines and mandatory minimums that the legislature has promul-
gated, yet must also do justice in the system in which they work.
Because of the perceived harshness of the sentencing guidelines,
one judge has gone so far as to resign, stating that he could no
longer serve a system that required him to impose sentences that
he believed were disproportionate and unjust. 65 Many judges
360. Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (1988). See also, Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (in which the Supreme Court held that the
Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional as a means of sentencing).
361. Heald, supra note 137, at 492.
362. Id.
363. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
364. See Hanchette, infra note 365. Guidelines are successful when they
appropriately guide discretion. The manipulation around that guidance
evidences the failure of the guidelines to limit the discretion exercised.
365. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea For Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 925 (1991). See also MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES REPORT, supra note 7, Appendix G. See also Criticizing Sentencing Rules,
U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22 (reporting that Federal
District Judge J. Lawrence Irving resigned because he believed that the
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have stressed the need for proportionate sentences and have
been active critics of the guideline system.
66
The proportionality principle is a foundation of the justice
system and in its absence, sentences are mechanistically applied,
justice is distorted, and the culpability of the offender becomes
irrelevant. Proportionality is
• . . a precept of fairness and justice that greater crimes
should merit harsher penalties than lesser crimes. The
notion that punishment should be proportional to the seri-
ousness of the offense is fundamental to maintaining an
identity between the criminal law and the public's general
sense of morality. In this way, proportionate sentencing
serves the purpose of instilling respect for penal law. A
penal system that imposes severe punishments for minor
crimes runs the risk of being discredited and ridiculed. 67
A system that fails to connect punishments with culpability
creates widespread dissatisfaction among judges, prosecutors,
and legislators and increases overall uncertainty and disparity as
sentencers attempt to manipulate the guidelines to their satisfac-
tion. Mandatory minimums go one step further away from pro-
portionality by eliminating almost every method by which ajudge
can exercise discretion and factor culpability into a sentence,
leaving a judge with little alternative but to impose what he or
she may believe to be an unjust punishment. Society also begins
to lose respect for a system that offends common notions of jus-
tice and proportionality.
sentencing guidelines were too harsh, and that he could not, in good
conscience, apply the guidelines). In a Gallup Poll of (Federal) Judges
commissioned by the American Bar Association, the results indicated that 56%
of all the judges surveyed said the guidelines worked poorly; 76% thought that
the guidelines gave prosecutors too much power in plea bargaining; and 94%
believed that the guidelines have created dissatisfaction in the judiciary. See
John Hanchette, Federal Judges Dislike Mandatory Minimum Sentences, Gannett
News Service, Oct. 2, 1993, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, GNS File.
366. See generally Jose Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 11, 1992 (In 1992, Cabranes was a federal district courtjudge. He
is currently serving on the Second Circuit) andJack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's
Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S,CAL. L. REv. 357 (1992).
367. Heald, supra note 137, at 472 (footnotes omitted). Almost everyone
would agree that greater crimes like murder should result in a more severe
punishment than a crime like shoplifting. The second statement, however,
poses the greatest challenge for those attempting to establish proportionality in
sentencing. Nothing can lead us to the conclusion that one year is the optimal,
and more importantly, the proportionate punishment for the crime of
shoplifting.
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Not everyone is so offended, however, and this explains both
the substantial number of mandatory minimums that exist today
and the harshness of the sentencing guidelines. While propor-
tionality is a desirable goal, those who adhere to a purely retribu-
tive or just deserts theory of punishment want to see a defendant
receive a punishment based solely on the fact that a crime was
committed and the nature of that offense. 6 No other purpose
of punishment, for example, to rehabilitate or deter, can justify
or limit the imposition of that punishment; punishment is justi-
fied solely by the criminal conduct of the offender.369 The fact
that the conduct may have been negligent or reckless does not
serve to limit the sentence imposed. For some retributivists, the
primary goal of punishment is not to rehabilitate or to deter the
offender, but to achieve public vindication for that crime and to
punish solely for the reason that a crime was committed.3
Retributive theories of justice were often used throughout the
1980s to win the support of voting constituencies and advance a
strong anti-crime platform.
71
On the other hand, limiting retributivists recognize other
purposes of punishment, such as deterrence or rehabilitation,
and the role these purposes play in sentencing.3 72 What lies at
the heart of a limiting retributivist philosophy, however, is the
need tojustify the imposition of that punishment based upon the
fact that the offender deserves it, and not some other goal such as
crime prevention. 7 Limiting retributivists would use desert to
limit the amount and kind of punishment imposed on an
offender.3 74 If an overly severe punishment is imposed, either
because of some need for deterrence or because of some per-
ceived ability to rehabilitate if the offender is confined in prison
for a very long time, limiting retributivists would use desert as a
ceiling on that punishment.3 75 This theory is closely linked to,
and comports well with, the proportionality principle, which
368. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 4, at 151-52.
369. Id.
370. HART, supra note 350, at 235.
371. Taifa, supra note 71.
372. MoRms, supra note 15.
373. PACKER, supra note 150, at 67.
374. Id. at 65-70. This is contrasted with a pure retributivist theory, which
would justify a harsher punishment than may be deserved, based upon a need
for public vindication and revenge.
375. Id. He writes that "[p ] unishments must be individualized but within
limits, limits having to do both with the need for deterrence and with
judgments about comparative morality, as well with the relative difficulties of
predicting future behavior." Id. at 140.
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seeks to limit the punishment imposed on an individual based on
what is deserved.
Still,another problem arises in the search for proportionality
and the use of mandatory minimums or strict sentencing guide-
lines to achieve that goal. When two similarly situated offenders
with identical criminal histories are given two different
sentences, a question arises as to the culpability of the offenders
and the proportionality of their sentences. Does the offender
who received a harsher sentence understand the subtle differ-
ences in their relative culpabilities or does he or she feel unfairly
treated because of the disparities in the two sentences?
The answer does not have to be a resounding "yes." Propor-
tionality is not necessarily achieved by imposing equivalent
sentences on like offenders, because there are two aspects to
equivalency: equivalency from the offenders' perspective and
equivalency from the perspective of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 76 Two virtually identical offenders who committed identi-
cal offenses are less concerned with the sameness of their
sentences than they are with the equivalency in the subjective
burden of punishment that each must endure - the hardship of
their respective punishments. One offender does not want to
feel that another, similarly situated offender, has "gotten off
easy." Should the subjective burdens of a sentence be equivalent
between the offenders, it may matter little that one is imprisoned
and the other punished in some other way. What is important,
then, is equivalency in the burden, by which I mean the form and
length of sentence imposed on the offenders.
From the perspective of society and the criminal justice sys-
tem, equivalence in the function of the sentence is more impor-
tant than equivalencies in terms of punishment.377 Again, if
society believes that deterrence, rehabilitation or even the
receipt of just deserts can be achieved either by one year in
prison or 1000 hours of community service, society may be indif-
ferent to the punishment chosen by the sentencer. The sentenc-
ing guidelines require that the purpose(s) to be served in
punishing must be considered when reaching a sentence for a
given offender.3 78 If one of the purposes of sentencing is to
rehabilitate, one sentence could require a shorter prison term
and mandatory drug rehabilitation programs, whereas another
could impose only a prison sentence, where, for example, the
offender is no longer drug-dependent. The purposes served by
376. Moius & ToNRY, supra note 156, at 100-04.
377. Id.
378. Id.
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the "disparate" and unequal sentences are, for society, more
important than identical sentences.
While this distinction is well noted in theory, in practice a
system of sentencing must make apparent, both to society and to
an individual offender, that equivalency in the punishment
imposed, by itself, is not a desirable goal. If this cannot be done,
the system will lose credibility. Therefore, it is necessary to have,
both in appearance and in fact, alternative punishments that
exact roughly the same subjective burden from the offenders.
This is the principle reason why mandatory minimums fail to
offer sentencers a viable alternative to sentencing guidelines.
Mandatory minimums impose the same sentence on offend-
ers, regardless of the purposes to be served in punishing, or the
true deserts of the offender. Mandatory minimums also leave a
sentencer with no alternative to incarceration and forbid any
consideration of alternative punishments, even if they impose the
same subjective burden on the offenders. Moreover, although
the same punishment is imposed on two apparently similar
offenders, just because equivalency in punishment has been
achieved does not mean thatjustice has been served. Mandatory
minimums are completely divorced from any proportionality
review, whereas alternative punishments, which are equivalent in
the burdens they impose, internalize proportionality review at
every stage of sentencing. Finally, imposing mandatory
sentences is the "easy way out," whereas finding these equivalent
burdens can be a very onerous task. Morris and Tonry support a
system of interchangeable punishments:37
The path of wisdom, in terms of justice and political
acceptability, requires the enunciation of some rough
interchangeabilities between different types of punish-
ments. The aim must be to identify punishments with
roughly equal punitive properties that are suited to the
variety of social threats and personal conditions that char-
acterize offenders, a diversity of punishments suited to
social needs, that do not result in unwarranted sentencing
disparities."' 0
The authors recognize however, that exact equivalencies are
always impossible to achieve. This is because prison in rural Con-
necticut may be vastly different from a hard labor penitentiary in
Arizona."8' Additionally, one year of prison may mean much less
379. Id. at 10-11.
380. Id. at 90. Washington has also implemented a system of
equivalencies. See Fallen, supra note 190, at 147-148.
381. Moms & TONRY, supra note 156, at 95.
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in terms of impact on lifestyle to a middle class, educated teen-
ager than it would to an urban youth who earns the only source
of income to his or her family.382 Is it therefore proper to
impose two different punishments on two similarly situated
defendants without offending traditional notions ofjustice? The
answer is clearly yes, if these "rough equivalencies" can be found.
An interchangeability concept could work as follows:
One month of imprisonment = 30 days intermittent confinement
= one month's community service
= two month's home detention
= 100 hours community service.
383
If these equations were made known to the public, not only
would there be certainty in the sentence received,384 but offend-
ers sentenced differently would be aware that the other was serv-
ing an equivalent sentence, though expressed in different terms.
That the public believes in the "fairness" of the process is crucial
to the acceptance of such a system, for if the varying sentences
are not perceived as roughly equivalent punishments, offenders
will object and society might sympathize with offenders who are
considered victims of an unjust and severe system. If, however, a
rough system of interchangeable sentences could be established,
which (1) relates culpability to time served; (2) incorporates
notions ofjust deserts; and (3) integrates multiple forms of pun-
ishment, then credibility and fairness would return to sentenc-
ing. A side-effect of this system would be to relieve some of the
burden off of existing penal facilities and free up some of the
already exceeded capacity of prisons.
38 5
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION
Despite any faults in the sentencing guidelines, the Commis-
sion has laid the groundwork for an equitable and workable sys-
tem. With respect to recommendations for the future, the
Commission first should recalculate the sentencing guideline
382. Id. at 95.
383. Id. at 74-75.
384. This certainty would arise from the fact that a sentence would either
be within at least the specified guideline range, or if the equivalency method
was used, that the sentence would be readily determinable (within limits) based
on the applicable guideline range and equivalency "equation." For example, if
an offender is convicted of theft, under a guideline system it is at least certain
that the offender will be sentenced within the guideline range (subject to
departure). If the sentencer instead chooses to impose an equivalent
punishment, using the guideline range it will be certain that the guideline
range will serve as the upper and lower limits on the equivalent punishment
imposed.
385. Id.
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ranges. In doing so, mandatory minimums should be repealed
and transformed into "target sentences" within the guideline sys-
tem.3 86 To arrive at the proper target, the Commission should
consider penal policies, the needs of the offender and commu-
nity, and available data on crime prevention techniques. Past
sentencing practices based upon virtually unlimited discretion,
while useful to analyze whatjudges considered appropriate in the
past, should be relevant only to the extent that the policies
behind them match current knowledge about crime. 87
In addition, sentences other than incarceration should be
established to ease the tension involved with prison overcrowding
and to sentence minor or first time offenders according to what
they truly deserve. These alternative methods of punishment
could include early supervised release, probationary periods,
extensive rehabilitation programs, and community service.
Michael Tonry and Norval Morris articulate three conditions that
should be fulfilled before incarceration is appropriate: (1) any
lesser punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime
or crimes committed; (2) imprisonment is necessary for deter-
rence, general or special; and (3) other less restrictive sanctions
have been frequently or recently applied to this offender.38 8 The
goal must be to connect, as far as possible, the nature and sever-
ity of the sentence with the offense committed.389 Because no
equation exists that would tell us how to do this with any preci-
sion, the goal should be to relate (as thoroughly as humanly pos-
sible) punishments to the comparative seriousness of the offense
and culpability of the offender.
The Commission, as well as the States, should also consider
modifying prosecutorial, as opposed to judicial, discretion within
the sentencing process. Charging guidelines are not the answer,
but the federal and state commissions could require that the
charging process be done "on the record" instead of secretly.
This would then subject the prosecutor's actions to appellate
review, and help insure that a charge brought closely matches
the offense committed. Of course, this does not entail the elimi-
nation of plea bargaining, as it is often a necessary means to
reduce ever-increasing caseloads. Instead, pleas must be to "rea-
386. The Commission itself has suggested that Congress repeal
mandatory minimums. See MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES REPORT, supra note
7, at introduction and Chapter 7.
387. Judge George E. Mackinnon, What Two Steps Do You Recommend
Congress Take to Improve the Sentencing Guideline System?, 1 FED. SENTENCING REP.
3599 378 (1989) (compilation of survey results and text).
388. MoIs & TONRY, supra note 156, at 90.
389. Id.
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sonable" charges, those that do not minimize the crime commit-
ted or provide too light a sentence for the offender.
Perhaps the most important and necessary method of
improving the guidelines is also the most obvious - return
enough discretion to judges so they may consider all relevant
offender and offense characteristics. This does not mean a
return to unconstrained discretionary sentencing, where every
factor that the defendant wishes to assert in his favor must be
considered. Rather, it contemplates the consideration of factors
"not ordinarily relevant," such as age, family responsibilities,
work experience or drug and alcohol abuse. The purpose of sen-
tencing is to match the appropriate punishment to the individual
defendant. It is for this reason that the sentencer should have
greater discretion in the factors that may be considered when
sentencing. These factors are not permissible as mitigating or
aggravating factors in a determination of guilt or innocence, and
this serves as an additional safeguard to the integrity of the trial
court's findings.
To alleviate prison overcrowding and capacity constraints,
the individual states should enact legislation which requires legis-
lators to tailor sentences to current prison capacities.' Not only
would this encourage the use of alternative methods of punish-
ment, but it would relieve some of the tension of prison over-
crowding and free up funds that would have gone to building
new institutions. This money could then be channeled into reha-
bilitation programs, a restitutionary fund for victims of crime, or
a tax cut for constituents. To ensure the success of this legisla-
tion, both federal and state legislatures would have to implement
some variation on the interchangeability concept discussed pre-
viously.3 9 The legislature could work with both judges and pros-
ecutors to determine the mechanics of the formula, which
should link, as closely as possible, culpability to the offense
committed.
Finally, the Commission should require all those involved in
the sentencing process to attend continuing education sessions
on the guidelines and their policy objectives. 92 It is in this type
of forum that judges and prosecutors are best able to raise ques-
tions of interpretation without testing them on convicted defend-
ants. The Commission then is afforded the opportunity to clarify
390. Again, the states have done well in this area - staving off more
substantial increases in prison overcrowding and drains on penal resources by
tying sentencing policy to those resources. See supra notes 256-260 and
accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 376-382 and accompanying text.
392. Mopus & TONRY, supra note 156, at 11.
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ambiguous points in the guidelines, obtain valuable input from
the participants, and use that information to amend, create, or
repeal guidelines as needed. This is consistent with the evolu-
tionary nature of the guidelines and their need to reflect current
notions of fairness and justice. The Commission could then pub-
lish periodic policy statements and commentary for the legal
community, or request their opinions on proposed amendments.
The ability of a sentencer to depart is one of the most impor-
tant areas in which the Commission needs to concentrate its edu-
cational efforts. Judges, concerned that their sentencing
decisions will be overturned on appeal, are hesitant to explore
the limits of their discretion. The Commission should take spe-
cial care to instruct both district and appellate courts about their
respective roles regarding departures under the guidelines.
XII. CONCLUSION
The federal guidelines seem to be driven by a quest for the
unattainable - the ideal sentencing system. The U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission has attempted to account for every possible
combination of offense and offender within a 258-box grid, and
to properly reflect the seriousness of the offense and culpability
of each offender using a mechanical, mathematical approach to
sentencing. However, any system that purports to equate a crime
with a certain punishment is not only misguided, but concep-
tually flawed; such an equation is humanly impossible. It may at
first seem logical, and indeed readily apparent that murder is to
be punished more severely than theft - but this intuition,
though grounded in notions of "justice" cannot lead a sentencer
to the conclusion that 20 years in prison is definitively the right
sentence for murder.
Nevertheless, even if a sentencer is unable to equate the
incommensurables of culpability and the offense committed, this
should not leave the determination of sentences wholly at the
mercy of the legislature. The role of the judiciary must be exer-
cised with the necessary discretion to consider who is being sen-
tenced, and to tailor punishments to the unique circumstances
of every case. Though the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines still fall
short of this ideal, they far surpass mandatory minimums in their
ability to respond to the special circumstances of each case.
Because mandatory minimums have failed in their essential
purposes and conflict with sentencing policy and with concepts
of just and fair punishment, they should be repealed and
replaced by a sentencing guideline system that incorporates dis-
cretion and proportionality with structure and some degree of
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certainty. Such a system is possible through the existing guide-
lines, although some modifications are necessary. These modifi-
cations must have, as their guiding principle, a commitment to
the creation of a sentencing system that considers the culpability
of an offender, the nature of the offense committed, and the
purposes to be served by the imposition of punishment. Sentenc-
ing cannot be reduced to a rigid, mechanical process unless a
sentencer may depart from that process, when appropriate, with-
out fear of appellate review. Anything less sacrifices the identity
and uniqueness of those being sentenced, all of whom may not
be equally morally culpable.
